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Introduction 
 
  On October 24, 1950, France presented the Pleven Plan, proposing West German 
rearmament encapsulated in a supranational European Army and a European defense 
organization, eventually evolving into the European Defense Community (EDC). Ultimately, 
European efforts to devise and ratify the EDC-Treaty, a framework in which West Germany 
could be safely rearmed, would last almost four years. However, it was the French National 
Assembly which ultimately rejected the EDC on August 30, 1954.1 Charles Cogan skillfully 
described the EDC’s paradox: ‘the EDC, conceived by some (though not all) Frenchman to get 
around American insistence on German rearmament in the wake of the invasion of South 
Korea, was finally rejected by the French themselves – who almost immediately thereafter 
turned around and accepted essentially what the Americans had preferred at the beginning: 
a German Army as part of a sovereign German state within NATO.’2 
  Because of European reluctance to remilitarize West Germany, Washington needed a 
solution and, Kenneth Weisbrode maintains, ‘squaring the circle meant the invention of 
something called the European Defense Community.’3 As Michael Creswell indicates, ‘much 
of the French public along with the military leadership and leading political parties loathed 
the EDC.’4 However, Washington ‘made establishing the EDC a top priority.’5 James 
McAllister even claims that installing the EDC ‘was by far the single most important objective 
                                                          
1 Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question, 1945-1955’, Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer 2003), 22; Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United 
States Created Cold War Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 161-162; Victor 
Gavin, ‘Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954)’, Society 
for the Study of French History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 2009), 78; Christopher Gehrz, “Dean 
Acheson, the JCS and the ‘single package’: American policy on German rearmament, 1950,” Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2001), 154-155. 
2 Quotation is from Charles G. Cogan, Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends. The United States and France since 1940 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 75. 
3 Quotation is from Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlanticists. A Story of American Diplomacy (Santa Ana, California: 
Nortia Press, 2015), 91. 
4 Quotation is from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 166.  
5 Ibid., 167. 
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of American foreign policy in the early 1950s.’6 These statements indicate that Washington 
attributed considerable importance to the EDC.7  
  Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is: to what extent was the EDC initiated by 
the US and what was their intended aim with the EDC? Regarding the EDC’s initiation, 
Washington’s ‘single package’ proposal, presented by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson at 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit in New York in September 1950, was of 
considerable importance. As part of the ‘single package,’ Acheson demanded the creation of 
a ‘European defense force’ that should incorporate German divisions.8 Christopher Gehrz 
claims that many historians, such as James McAllister, have acknowledged Acheson’s 
assertion that before the September 1950 NAC summit, the JCS ‘forced him to adopt the so-
called “single package” tactic.’9 But Gehrz argues that declassified documents show it was 
the State Department and Acheson who actually were in charge of decision making 
concerning the ‘single package.’10  
  As McAllister indicates, due to the international attention for the September 1950 NAC 
summit, it had become impossible to postpone Western discussions on German rearmament 
until Washington and Paris had settled their disagreements discreetly.11 However, although 
McAllister qualifies this fact as a ‘serious consequence’, this thesis argues that it seems more 
plausible that the Americans brought ‘the German rearmament question’ out publicly on 
purpose.12 For instance, Gehrz and Robert L. Beisner claim that Acheson fully supported the 
‘single package’ as an American strategy in NATO-negotiations on rearming the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG). This suggests that the Truman administration deliberately 
brought the German rearmament issue to public attention.13 This thesis aspires to illuminate 
                                                          
6 James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 171.  
7 McAllister eventually concludes that ‘the French rejection of the EDC was the most spectacular defeat of 
American foreign policy in the early postwar era.’ Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 242. 
8 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26-27; 
and Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 362. 
9 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135; and McAllister, No Exit, 188. 
10 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135. 
11 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; and McAllister, No Exit, 191.  
12 McAllister, No Exit, 191. 
13 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 150-153; and Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 366. 
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the historiographical disagreement on Acheson’s role in the ‘single package’, and explain this 
American proposal’s role in initiating the EDC project. Furthermore, this paper disagrees 
with Gehrz’s claim that Washington’s ‘single package’ strategy does not fit into ‘[John Lewis] 
Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance management.’ Instead, it is argued that the 
‘single package’ strategy is an exception within Gaddis’ model of US alliance management, 
which acknowledges that if required the US could adopt coercion against Western 
partners.14   
  Regarding Washington’s intended aim with the EDC, Ronald W. Pruessen observes that in 
the historiography, initially scholars primarily stressed US fixations on Communist 
expansionism. Washington became determined to increase Western Europe’s 
‘“containment” contributions,’ including a considerable FRG military contribution.15 As 
Pruessen and Creswell indicate, the argument was that Washington had two primary 
motives; ‘EDC was conceived as a tool of “dual containment,”’ containing both the SU and 
the FRG.16 However, Pruessen argues this concept ‘should be expanded to “triple 
containment,”’ which includes another American motive for supporting the EDC: resolving 
‘more broadly European problems.’17 Although Pruessen’s ‘triple containment’ argument 
seems plausible, it seems it is not widely accepted in the historiography.18 
  Meanwhile, McAllister argues that the Truman administration and Eisenhower 
administration principally backed the EDC because they were convinced ‘it represented the 
best long-term solution to the German problem.’19 Eventually, it can be concluded that 
Washington had multiple aims with the EDC. However, this paper maintains that one of the 
                                                          
14 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 200-201;  
and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 137, 154-155. Quotation is from page 155. 
Gaddis mentions the 1956 Suez Crisis as an exception to the rule, when the US used coercion because its allies 
refused to cooperate. 
15 Ronald W. Pruessen, ‘Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to the European Defense Community: 
One Corner of a Triangle’, Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1996), 51-52. 
16 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John 
J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 
130; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 1-4. 
17 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52. 
18 Ibid., 67, 69. 
19 McAllister, No Exit, 172. 
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three American aims as stated in NSC-160/1, ‘the securing of a German contribution to 
European defense,’ was Washington’s most crucial short-term aim with the EDC, because of 
NSC-68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ and its pressing request for an accelerated 
Western rearmament effort.20 Accordingly, contrary to McAllister’s account, it is argued that 
this was the fundamental reason for both US administrations involved to support the EDC.21    
  Because this paper’s primary interest is illuminating Washington’s involvement in the EDC, 
the historiography and primary sources that are discussed are mostly in English. However, 
many of the scholars referred to did make extensive use of French primary sources and 
French literature.22 Furthermore, this thesis will focus less on Britain’s involvement in the 
                                                          
20 Quotation is from ‘Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the 
Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)’, July 21, 1953, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1 (Washington, DC: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 799. (hereafter FRUS, with relevant year, volume number, 
and document page numbers); ‘Second Plenary Tripartite Meeting of the Heads of Government, Mid Ocean 
Club, Bermuda, December 5, 1953, 5 P.M. United States Delegation Minutes’, FRUS, 1952-1954, Western 
European Security, Volume V, Part 2 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 1782-
1783; ‘No. 214 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council’ (NSC-160/1), August 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952-
1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 
1986), 510-520; Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 67; Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European 
Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950 – 55, (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), 3; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, ‘A Report to the National Security 
Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)’, April 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign 
Economic Policy, Volume I (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977) 234-292. See in 
particular pages 272 and 287-292. 
21 McAllister, No Exit, 172. 
22 See for example: Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question, 1945-1955’, 
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 2003, (5–28); William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold 
War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998); Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States 
Created Cold War Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Irwin M. Wall, The 
United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); 
Victor Gavin, ‘Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954),’ 
Society for the Study of French History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 2009); and Kenneth 
Weisbrode, The Atlanticists. A Story of American Diplomacy (Santa Ana, California: Nortia Press, 2015). 
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EDC, the EDC-Treaty’s ratification process, and the alternative Western arrangement that 
was eventually devised for rearming the FRG.23      
  The first chapter will discuss the American position on, and involvement in, the EDC 
initiative, until the announcement of the Pleven Plan. It will also consider the Containment 
strategy and the historiography on the ‘single package’ proposal. The second chapter will 
discuss the French position on, and involvement in, the EDC initiative, until the Pleven Plan. 
Because this paper’s research question focuses on Washington’s role concerning the EDC, 
the second chapter will primarily illuminate how France’s position on a European army 
related to the American position. It also discusses the historiography on France and ‘the 
German problem.’ For instance, this thesis disputes Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’s 
argument that Paris was not somehow forced to accept a US policy for Germany which 
France totally opposed,24 and disagrees with their conclusion that fundamentally ‘Western 
policy [on Germany] was consensual’ before the September 1950 NAC.25 The third chapter 
will illuminate both the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, and the French intended 
aim with the EDC. Again, the main focus will be on how French aims related to Washington’s 
aims. Furthermore, the third chapter will illuminate the connection between the EDC, 
German rearmament and the Schuman Plan.  
  In researching American involvement with the EDC, many valuable primary and secondary 
sources were consulted. Particularly the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United 
States series has been tremendously valuable for consulting US government records.26 
Another useful source has been the Documents on British Policy Overseas series for British 
primary sources.27 This thesis also frequently refers to French documents from the Ministère 
                                                          
23 For an elaborate account of these particular subjects, see for instance: Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the 
European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950 – 55 
(London: Macmillan, 2000); and Kevin Ruane, ‘Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and 
the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, No. 4, (December 2002), 151-185.   
24 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16. In this paper, ‘Germany’ as well as 
‘Germans’ are descriptions that are used for referring to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its 
nationals, except if indicated otherwise.   
25 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16. 
26 All volumes in the FRUS series can be accessed online: http://history.state.gov/ 
27 Documents on British Policy Overseas is available online: http://dbpo.chadwyck.co.uk/home.do 
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des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) series and mentions in its footnotes, when any French primary 
source is referred to, in which specific scholarly work this reference can also be found. 
Finally, for NATO records the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Archives have been 
consulted.28   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 The NATO Archives can be found online: http://archives.nato.int/ 
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I. The American involvement in the EDC initiative until the Pleven Plan 
 
  It can be argued that particularly during September and October 1950 the French 
government was pressured by the Truman administration to present an elaborate plan for a 
‘European defense force’, which eventually resulted in the introduction of the Pleven Plan.29 
Meanwhile, Creswell indicates, Washington repeatedly emphasized that devising such a plan 
had to be initiated by one or several European countries.30 For Washington, Bonn’s 
partnership in Western defense was very desirable, because of the FRG’s strategic location 
in Europe and its industrial and military capabilities. However, German rearmament was 
controversial and could be dangerous because of Moscow’s conceivable negative response 
and the precariousness regarding Germany’s political organization.31 As Creswell maintains, 
two major concerns troubled Washington during 1950 regarding Western Europe: ‘a 
devastating Soviet attack and the possible withering of German democracy.’32  
  However, the Korean War and increasing Cold War tensions eventually resulted in the 
Truman administration changing its position on German rearmament by end July 1950, now 
advocating swift FRG remilitarization.33 As Creswell indicates, NATO officials also maintained 
German units were required to implement NATO’s strategy for organizing European defense, 
as described in DC-6 and the Medium Term Defense Plan.34 Because Washington became 
convinced that a German military contribution to Western Europe’s defense was crucial for 
                                                          
29 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24-30. 
30 Ibid., 14-15, 26-27; Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 372; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 151; and ‘The 
Secretary of State to the Embassy in France’, November 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), 496-498; and ‘The Secretary of State to the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Schuman)’, December 20, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 605-606. 
31 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 25-26. 
32 Ibid., 26. 
33 ‘Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson’, July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 167-168; Schwartz, 
America’s Germany, 129-130; McAllister, No Exit, 186; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26. 
34 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 12-13; and John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s 
Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 30. The text of NATO Defense 
Committee paper number 6 (DC-6) and additional background information can be found in FRUS, 1949, 
Western Europe, Volume IV (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 352-356; and 
ibid., Volume IV, 1-3. 
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containing the SU, it pressured European allies to accept immediate German rearmament, 
culminating in the ‘single package’ at the NAC in New York in September 1950.35 As part of 
this ‘single package’, Acheson demanded the creation of a ‘European defense force’ that 
should incorporate German divisions.36    
  However, France continued to disagree with NATO allies on the pace of German 
rearmament in September 1950. According to McAllister, neither the State Department nor 
Acheson had considered the major consequences if France persisted in rejecting immediate 
German rearmament. Because of the international attention for the September 1950 NAC 
summit, it had become impossible to postpone German rearmament until American-French 
disagreements were settled discreetly.37 However, although McAllister qualifies this fact as a 
‘serious consequence’, it could be that the Americans brought ‘the German rearmament 
question’ out publicly on purpose.38 For instance, Gehrz claims that Acheson fully supported 
the ‘single package’ as an American strategy in NATO-negotiations on rearming Germany. 
This suggests that the Truman administration deliberately brought the German rearmament 
issue to public attention.39 Eventually, McAllister concludes that ‘much of the [American] 
alliance diplomacy’ between 1950-54 was ‘an attempt to recover from the damage caused 
by the premature effort to sell the one package proposal in September 1950,’40 and that in 
his memoirs Acheson ‘acknowledges his mistake’ in adopting the ‘single package.’41  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26-27; 
and Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4. 
36 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26-27; 
and Beisner, A life in the Cold War, 362. 
37 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; and McAllister, No Exit, 191.  
38 McAllister, No Exit, 191. 
39 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135-160. See especially pages 150-151, and 153-
155. 
40 McAllister, No Exit, 191-192. 
41 Ibid., 192; When making this claim, McAllister referred to Acheson’s own memoirs: Dean Acheson, Present at 
the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 437-440.  
11 
 
NSC-68 and Western Europe’s contribution to containment 
 
  Already prior to the Korean War’s beginning in June 1950, Washington initiated a major 
revision concerning the Containment strategy. This review, which resulted in NSC-68 in the 
spring of 1950, was motivated by rapidly increasing Cold War tensions and the Soviet 
detonation of an atomic weapon in August 1949, which suddenly ended the United States’ 
nuclear monopoly.42 Cold War tensions had already increased when Washington announced 
the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and implemented the Marshall Plan in April 1948, to 
contain ‘potential Soviet expansionism.’43  
  George Frost Kennan, the first director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), was the main 
architect of the American Containment strategy towards the SU, introducing the concept of 
‘containment’ in summer 1947.44 As Gaddis indicates, Kennan argued that the United States’ 
national security interests could best be protected not by reorganizing the international 
order through international institutions, the ‘universalistic’ approach, but rather by adopting 
the ‘particularist’ solution, thus preserving equilibrium within the international order 
through ‘counterforce’ and maintaining its diversity.45 Accordingly, no single power or 
alliance ‘could dominate it.’46  
  Gaddis indicates that Kennan’s aim of containment was to confine ‘Soviet expansionism,’ 
and that Kennan particularly warned against Soviet subjugation through psychological 
means. Japan and Western Europe could become increasingly demoralized because of 
postwar reconstruction and societal disorder, thus making them susceptible to communist-
inspired coups and communist political successes.47 Accordingly, Moscow could gain 
                                                          
42 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 2-3. 
43 Quotation is from Ibid., 1. 
44 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during 
the Cold War, Revised and Expanded Edition, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 24-25. Kennan 
introduced the concept of ‘containment’ in his article ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ in summer 1947: See 
‘X’ (George Frost Kennan), ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, XXV (July 1947), 566-582. 
45 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 26-28, 55.  
46 Ibid., 26-28. For a more elaborate description of the concepts of ‘universalist’ approach and ‘particularist’ 
approach, see also pages 26-28 of Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 
47 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 33-34.  
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effective control over these strategically crucial areas. As Gaddis maintains, Kennan’s 
concept of containment was principally focused on this particular danger of Soviet 
expansionism; targeting nearby countries with psychological postwar misery and accordingly 
threatening the international ‘balance of power.’ Consequently, it was less concerned about 
a Soviet invasion or ‘international communism.’48       
  Eventually, the Containment strategy’s ultimate aim was, in Gaddis’ words, ‘to build an 
international order made up of independent centers of power, in which nations subject to 
Soviet pressure would have both the means and the will to resist it themselves.’49 By late 
1948, Kennan had devised three points that were required to achieve this aim. First, 
restoring the international ‘balance of power’ by stimulating the self-confidence in countries 
confronted with ‘Soviet expansionism.’50 Second, capitalizing on strained relations between 
‘the international communist movement’ and the Kremlin. And third, ultimately changing 
the SU’s notion of ‘international relations,’ in order to produce a Cold War settlement with 
Washington on unresolved disagreements.51            
  Finally, NSC-68 promoted ‘military containment’ of international communism through a 
considerable expansion in US conventional, nuclear and thermonuclear armaments. 
However, Western European nations would have to make a significant military contribution 
as well to NSC-68’s rearmament effort for containing the USSR.52 Meanwhile, the Korean 
War led to increased attention for NSC-68, but also endangered Washington’s plans for 
increasing Western military capabilities, draining crucial resources. With NSC-68’s 
rearmament effort, Washington wanted to restore the international ‘balance of power’ and 
rule out a decisive nuclear surprise attack by Moscow and US defeat by 1954.53                                        
  NSC-68 distinguished four options for confronting Soviet Communism: ‘a. Continuation of 
current policies, (…); b. Isolation; c. War; and d. A more rapid building up of the political, 
                                                          
48 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 34. 
49 Ibid., 35, 55. Quotation is from page 55. 
50 Ibid., 35. 
51 Ibid.; and NSC-20/1, August 18, 1948, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. Containment: 
Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) 176-189.  
52 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and 
NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292.  
53 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 265-269. 
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economic, and military strength of the free world.’54 Eventually, NSC-68 strongly 
recommended the fourth option, describing the general US Cold War strategy as: ‘building 
up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used.’55 Washington’s main 
objective was to develop ‘such political and economic conditions in the free world,’ 
supported by adequate military power, that Moscow would adjust itself to these 
circumstances ‘and eventually change its policies drastically.’56  
  Washington eventually adopted NSC-68’s fourth option, which also demanded from the US 
to reinforce Europe’s defense. However, Creswell argues, US officials regarded this fourth 
option merely ‘as a temporary arrangement.’57 Washington ultimately wanted its European 
allies to increase their own military power to such an extent that an American military 
presence was eventually no longer required. Yet, NSC-68 did not contain any proposals 
regarding German rearmament.58    
 
German rearmament and the EDF concept  
 
  Prior to the Korean War, the Pentagon already tried to persuade the State Department to 
abandon its opposition to German rearmament.59 Furthermore, US Secretary of Defense 
Louis Johnson tried to convince President Harry Truman by forwarding the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff’s (JCS) pro-rearmament position in NSC-71 in June 1950. NSC-71 suggested ‘applying 
                                                          
54 NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 272. See pages 272-287 for a description of the four possible courses of action 
distinguished by NSC-68. See pages 287-292 for NSC-68’s conclusions and recommendations. 
55 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24-25; NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 279-282, 291 (Quotation is from page 
291). 
56 NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 272, 291. Quotations are from page 272. 
57 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 25. 
58 Ibid., 25; and McAllister, No Exit, 184. 
59 McAllister, No Exit, 184-185. 
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political pressure in order to overcome French opposition’ against remilitarizing Germany.60 
However, Truman condemned NSC-71, calling it ‘decidedly militaristic.’61 
  In response to NSC-71, which advocated American initiatives enabling European acceptance 
of German rearmament, the State Department produced NSC-71/1.62 This paper, written just 
before the Korean War by Henry Byroade63 and approved by Acheson in July 1950, 
reaffirmed the State Department’s resistance to rearming Germany. NSC-71/1 asserted that 
FRG rearmament would obstruct Bonn’s democratic development and could reverse 
France’s moderate German policy.64 
  However, eventually the Korean War also led the State Department to favor German 
rearmament. Moreover, West German pressure combined with increasing demands from 
the US Congress and created strong impetus for resolving the rearmament question.65 As 
Thomas Schwartz indicates, US High Commissioner John McCloy played a crucial role in this 
process because of ‘his interpretation of German sentiment’ and McCloy’s efforts for 
establishing a ‘European’ military force.66 Eventually, McCloy believed that without FRG 
rearmament it would be politically inconceivable that the US Congress would continue a US 
commitment to defend Western Europe.67        
                                                          
60 McAllister, No Exit, 185. Quotation is from page 185; and NSC-71,‘Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
with Respect to Western Policy Toward Germany,’ June 8, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The 
Soviet Union, Volume IV (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1980), 686-87.      
61 McAllister, No Exit, 185; and ‘Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State’, June 16, 1950, FRUS, 
1950, Volume IV, 688-689. 
62 NSC-71/1, ‘Views of the State Department on the Rearmament of Western Germany’, July 3, 1950, FRUS, 
1950, Volume IV, 691. 
63 Henry Byroade was the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs. 
64 McAllister, No Exit, 185-186; and NSC-71/1, FRUS, 1950, Volume IV, 692-693.  
65 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 124-127.  
66 Ibid., 126. For a more elaborate description of how McCloy’s diplomatic reports from Germany, throughout 
this period, considerably influenced the State Department’s change regarding its policy on German 
rearmament, see Schwartz, America’s Germany, 124-130.   
67 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 128-129; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the 
Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
1980), 110.   
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  Concurrently Byroade, inspired by the Schuman Plan, advised Acheson that German 
rearmament should be based on ‘some type of European army.’68 The US ambassador in 
Paris, David Bruce, also reported that German rearmament within an Atlantic or European 
army would be more acceptable for France.69 By end July 1950, Acheson and Truman 
eventually agreed with FRG rearmament, and Truman approved the State Department’s 
‘European army’ idea for integrating the FRG into the Western alliance.70 Consequently, 
McCloy and Byroade continued developing plans for a ‘European Defense Force’ (EDF). 
McCloy was primarily assisted by Colonel Al Gerhardt and Robert Bowie on covering the 
European resolution, while Byroade focused on military details.71  
  As McAllister indicates, the State Department developed a two-step strategy for rearming 
the FRG without estranging France and Europe. First, the US and British military presence in 
Europe should be strengthened before discussing FRG rearmament, because it wished to 
avoid a formal connection between these issues.72 Second was installing Germany’s military 
contribution inside a Western European institutional structure, resulting in the EDF, because 
the FRG should not be permitted to remilitarize on a nationalist footing.73 
  On August 16, 1950, the State Department forwarded a general EDF-concept to the 
Pentagon for consideration.74 The State Department believed that if the US took the lead in 
Western Europe’s defense, then European allies would readily hand over some of their 
sovereignty. Consequently, the EDF ‘could become a driving force toward further unification 
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Acheson’, July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 167-168. 
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David Bruce in Paris, and the American Representative to NATO, Charles Spofford; see Schwartz, America’s 
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in Western Europe,’75 and implied eventual German NATO-membership.76 As Schwartz 
indicated, the EDF would also accomplish the US objective of a ‘dual containment’; creating 
a powerful defense mechanism for Western Europe against possible military aggression from 
both Germany and the SU.77  
 
NSC-82: Washington’s request for an immediate FRG military contribution 
 
  However, by September 1950 the JCS suggested that FRG sovereignty could be restored 
within the Western alliance but supervised by NATO instead.78 The JCS also dismissed 
sending more US soldiers to Europe, or the nomination of NATO’s Supreme Commander, 
until Washington’s allies, in particular France, had expressed their explicit agreement with 
‘the principle of German rearmament.’79  
  One crucial contributing factor to Washington’s final support for German rearmament was 
the American resolve of warding off a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe, warned 
by the Korean War.80 This first consideration eventually combined with NSC-68’s 
recommended Western rearmament effort. Another important factor was US reluctance, 
particularly in the US Congress, to maintain a long-term military presence in Europe.81 
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Gradually, rearming Germany was in the US Congress also regarded as a way of relieving the 
military and financial burden of the US and allies for defending Europe.82 So eventually, 
Creswell argues, ‘the Truman administration subordinated reservations about remilitarizing 
the Federal Republic to realpolitik thinking,’ culminating in NSC-82.83 This document, 
approved on September 11, 1950, authorized supplementary American troops for Europe, 
but also requested a military contribution from Bonn straightaway.84 
  NSC-82 also adopted the EDF-concept and recommended an American as the EDF’s 
Supreme Commander on two conditions: that an American would be requested by the 
Europeans themselves and upon their pledge of contributing enough forces, including 
German troops.85 Because the EDF ‘should be subject to political and strategic guidance 
under NATO,’ NSC-82 recommended swift German NATO-membership. Finally, after 
European support had been achieved, the EDF-concept would be further developed.86  
 
The September 1950 NAC summit in New York 
 
  The Korean War caused a considerable acceleration of implementing NSC-68’s 
rearmament. Accordingly, Kevin Ruane indicates, at the New York NAC summit starting on 
15 September 1950, Acheson advocated creating twelve FRG divisions to counterbalance the 
SU’s conventional military superiority and allow a ‘forward defense’ strategy in Western 
Europe.87 Acheson also demanded that NATO Allies concur instantly and officially to 
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establish a ‘European defense force’ that should incorporate German divisions, otherwise 
Europe would not be given supplementary US military and financial support.88  
  Acheson gave several reasons for raising the German rearmament question. First, there 
seemed to be NATO-consensus that Western Europe’s defense should be installed as far east 
as possible in Germany.89 Therefore, requiring a German military contribution for defending 
itself was logical. Second, losing Germany would be a major geopolitical Soviet victory since 
Germany’s industrial and military potential could provide a decisive advantage in the Cold 
War.90 Finally, Konrad Adenauer, the FRG’s Chancellor, had offered German participation in 
a European army.91 At preliminary discussions on September 12, 1950, with Britain and 
France, Acheson already introduced this ‘single package proposal’: the deployment of 
supplementary US soldiers to Europe, a combined North Atlantic military framework and the 
nomination of a US citizen as SACEUR,92 would be contingent on European acceptance of 
rearming the FRG, and of establishing a European army that should contain twelve German 
divisions.93  
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The ‘single package’ and French objections 
 
  As McAllister indicates, Acheson did succeed in convincing the British ‘on the merits of the 
one package proposal.’94 However, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin worried that 
rearmament would give the FRG a too powerful bargaining position, could antagonize 
France, and could instigate Soviet intervention before Western defense was ready.95 Still 
London accepted the ‘single package’, because Washington would not increase its European 
responsibilities without compliance with rearming Germany.96  
  However, France resisted the ‘single package’ and declined to support German rearmament 
without adequate military and financial assurances. Yet, Washington refused to deliver such 
guarantees.97 As Creswell indicates, although most historians have characterized France as 
fiercely resisting German remilitarization, the records concerning the September 1950 NAC 
prove that Robert Schuman, France’s Foreign Minister, did not reject German rearmament in 
principle. Instead, Creswell convincingly argues that Schuman’s main concern was keeping 
these plans confidential.98      
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  Before New York, Schuman had cautioned Acheson not to raise German rearmament, since 
this would publicly show NATO disagreements over the FRG.99 Schuman declared on 
September 12 that France wanted restrictions on the FRG’s power and sovereignty, but also 
agreed that European defense needed a German contribution. Besides, Schuman wanted 
secret discussions with the Benelux nations on German rearmament,100 and insisted that 
NATO should first be reinforced without Germany, before France could deal with FRG 
rearmament.101         
  Nevertheless, Acheson presented to the complete NAC Washington’s German rearmament 
plans. Accordingly, Schuman expressed French concerns that it might endanger Germany’s 
denazification, could revive its militarism, would complicate Franco-German peace treaty 
negotiations, and could strengthen Moscow’s ties with its satellites.102 Paris also feared that 
German remilitarization could trigger Soviet hostility.103 Finally, Schuman stated that 
although France was not against German rearmament, the timing was wrong and harmful.104 
Still, McAllister indicates, Schuman was more responsive to Acheson’s reasoning than many 
other French officials. Particularly Minister of Defense Jules Moch stressed that Paris was not 
prepared to agree with the principle of rearming West Germany.105  
  McAllister indicates that the main objection of the Quai d’Orsay was skepticism that NATO 
could control a remilitarized Germany. For instance, senior official René Massigli maintained 
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German policy would always be principally driven by reunification, which could ultimately 
draw the West into a ‘preventive war’ with the USSR.106 Still, during the September 22-23 
NAC-meetings even Moch conceded that remilitarizing Germany was ‘rational on political 
grounds.’107 Eventually agreement was reached on an ‘integrated force’, organized within 
the NATO-framework, commanded by a US SACEUR. France also made a major concession 
by not rejecting ‘the German rearmament proposal in principle’ in the final NAC-
statement.108  
  Although this NAC-agreement did not mention the American concept of a ‘European 
defense force,’109 it did approve the swift creation ‘of an integrated force under centralized 
command and control,’110 with a similar main objective; ‘to deter aggression and ensure the 
defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany.’111 However, ‘the nature, extent 
and timing of German participation’ in Europe’s defense remained unresolved because it 
was still being discussed by Paris, London and Washington with the FRG’s government. 
Eventually, this ‘integrated force’ would not be concluded until Germany’s specific 
contribution was determined.112 
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Historiography on the ‘single package’  
 
  There is some disagreement within the historiography on the ‘single package’, particularly 
on Acheson’s role. Gehrz indicates that many historians, such as McAllister, have 
acknowledged Acheson’s assertion that before the September 1950 NAC summit, the JCS 
‘forced him to adopt the so-called “single package” tactic.’113 But Gehrz argues that 
declassified documents show it was the State Department and Acheson who actually were in 
charge of decision making concerning the ‘single package.’114 Therefore, Gehrz maintains 
that historians should particularly reassess Acheson's reputation of managing ‘the Western 
alliance as a democratic partnership.’115  
  According to Acheson’s memoirs, ‘the Pentagon stood united and immovable. I agreed with 
their strategic purpose and objective but thought their tactics murderous (...) I was clearly 
outflanked.’116 However, as Gehrz indicates, memoirs are problematic sources for historical 
research on a policymaking process because of fading memories, and because players can 
adjust their particular roles, thereby distorting the truth.117 Gehrz argues that most 
historians have endorsed this characterization of strong Pentagon support for the ‘single 
package’ overpowering the State Department’s and Acheson’s position. Therefore, it is 
useful to include a brief review of relevant conclusions, to investigate Gehrz’s claim of ‘the 
predominance of Acheson's account in the historiography.’118 David Clay Large argued that 
the ‘single package’ was ‘a clear victory for the military.’119 Furthermore, Large claimed 
‘Acheson reluctantly combined’ American assurances concerning Germany ‘with the 
coercive part of the Pentagon “package.”’120 
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  Using Acheson’s memoirs, Schwartz maintained ‘Acheson conceded the “essential 
correctness” of the Pentagon’s strategic objectives,’ but regarded the ‘single package’ tactic 
‘“murderous,” more an ultimatum than a negotiating position.’121 Schwartz also claimed that 
replacing Secretary of Defense Johnson by George Marshall ‘softened the sharp edges of the 
proposal.’122 Saki Dockrill argued that although Acheson ‘later confessed that “he had erred 
in agreeing to the package formula,”’ the Secretary had ‘several reasons why he felt impelled 
to adopt the Pentagon’s tactics.’123 For instance, the Europeans already discussed a 
European army, including West German divisions, at ‘the Council of Europe at Strasbourg 
between 9 and 11 August 1950.’124 Furthermore, the Korean War and the Soviet threat 
strengthened the Pentagon’s resolve to generate ‘greater European defense efforts,’ 
including FRG rearmament.125  
  Lawrence Kaplan agreed with Acheson that the ‘single package’ was principally a creation 
from the Pentagon,126 and claimed that Acheson had anticipated its rejection by the French 
but understood the Pentagon’s stance. However, ‘in bowing to Pentagon demands, he 
followed a course which he later claimed was “largely my own fault.”’127 James Chace 
maintained the Pentagon insisted ‘that no more American troops be sent to Europe until the 
German troops were designated to serve in a unified command.’128 However, Chace argues, 
Acheson thought that France could be persuaded by first creating ‘the unified command and 
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then demonstrate the need for German troops.’ But the Pentagon ‘held firm to their 
approach and Acheson finally gave in.’129  
  Gehrz demonstrates that even the JCS’s and Secretary of Defense’s histories ‘agree with 
Acheson's interpretation.’130 Alternatively, Robert J. McMahon stresses that ‘Acheson took a 
lead role in the administration’s development’ of the ‘single package.’131 Furthermore, 
‘Acheson insisted’ that ‘US officials needed to “keep the heat on the French,”’ and McMahon 
asserts that Acheson and Marshall ‘privately pressed French officials hard.’132  
  Beisner indicates Paris wanted ‘US troops directly opposite the Red Army and (…) a 
prestigious US general commanding NATO.’133 The Pentagon agreed on the conditions that 
Europeans rearmed themselves and accepted German rearmament, resulting in ‘a “single 
package.”’134 Beisner maintains that although Acheson ‘never liked bundling them together,’ 
he concurred with all the components of ‘the Pentagon’s “single package”: new US divisions 
(…), an American in command, and a rearmed FRG confined within a European force under 
NATO’s command.’135 The ‘single package’ caused considerable strain with US allies, but 
Beisner primarily blames ‘Acheson’s hard-charging diplomacy,’136 and indicates that 
‘Acheson was unusually aggressive.’137  
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  Gehrz concluded after researching the ‘single package’ that most scholars, prior to his 
article (published in 2001), have unfairly relied too much on Acheson’s memoirs. 
Accordingly, Gehrz asserts that the ‘consensus interpretation’, endorsing Acheson’s claim 
that ‘the JCS forced him’ to adopt the ‘single package’, is false.138 Meanwhile, McMahon’s 
and Beisner’s later research also has a more critical approach to Acheson’s role in the ‘single 
package.’139  
  As Gehrz indicates, between April and August 1950, the Pentagon and JCS published three 
documents advocating German rearmament. Crucially, none proposed a connection 
between US military assistance to Europe and FRG rearmament.140 Gehrz convincingly 
demonstrates that with ‘Byroade's “European Army” memo of 4 August,’ Acheson’s State 
Department was the first linking FRG rearmament to ‘the other elements of the package’141: 
additional US troops, ‘an integrated force, a combined chiefs structure and a supreme 
commander.’142     
  Furthermore, Gehrz demonstrates that the presidential ‘eight questions’ ultimatum, 
compelling the State Department and the Pentagon to make a decision on FRG rearmament, 
was formulated by the State Department officials Paul Nitze and Byroade on August 25, 
1950.143 Gehrz also observed that ‘the condition of German rearmament’ before installing an 
                                                          
138 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 139, 152. Quotation is from page 152. 
139 McMahon, The Creation of an American World Order, 137-139; and Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 360-366. 
140 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145. Those three papers, as pointed out by Gehrz, 
are: ‘JCS 2124 of 30 April, NSC-71 of 8 June, and JCS 2124/11 of 27 July.’ Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean 
Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145. 
141 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145, 152. The first quotation is from page 145, the 
second quotation is from page 152; and McMahon, The Creation of an American World Order, 137-139. 
142 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145-146; Gehrz also refers to Memo, ‘Byroade to 
Matthews’, 4 Aug. 1950, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Country and Area File, Box 28, Record Group 
(RG) 59, U.S. Department of State Central Files, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College 
Park, MD; and FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 211-219. 
143 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 144, 146, 152; ‘The President to the Secretary of 
State’ (The eight questions ultimatum), August 26, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III: 250-251; Gehrz also refers to 
Draft Memo by Nitze and Byroade, Records of the PPS, Country and Area File, Box 28, RG 59, NARA; MemCon, 
21 Aug. 1950, Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-1953), Reel 3. Paul Nitze was head of 
the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), the principal policy review division in the State Department. 
26 
 
American SACEUR cannot be detected in JCS records ‘until after the creation of a State-
Defense working group,’144 and that during the NAC the JCS had been the first approving a 
disruption of the ‘single package’, because it nominated a US SACEUR apart from its other 
components.145 This was considered ‘a change in the intent of NSC-82.’146 Furthermore, 
Gehrz and Beisner indicate that Acheson proclaimed his satisfaction with the ‘single package’ 
as a tactic during the NAC.147  
  Both scholars also maintain that once Truman and Acheson agreed, by 31 July 1950, that 
FRG rearmament was unavoidable,148 ‘the State Department and the White House 
controlled the decision making that led to the package plan.’149 Other scholars also agreed 
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that the Pentagon was not involved in Acheson’s manipulative diplomacy.150 Alternatively, 
Gehrz asserts, Bradley and Nitze had recommended that ideally Paris could be persuaded to 
propose FRG remilitarization itself.151  
  This latter approach would be in line with Gaddis’ model of US alliance management 
within NATO, through applying its democratic culture to international relations. According to 
Gaddis, Washington believed that by making sure not to intimidate or bribe its allies, it could 
prevent an adverse reaction within the US or Europe itself and could invalidate the Leninist 
thesis arguing that capitalist countries were incapable of cooperation.152 However, Gehrz 
argues that Washington’s ‘single package’ strategy does not fit into Gaddis’ model of US 
alliance management, because for obtaining European agreement with FRG remilitarization, 
Acheson bribed US allies by offering a stronger US commitment to Western Europe’s 
security. Acheson also demanded German rearmament and threatened that Europe could 
lose prospective military aid.153  
  However, it seems more likely that the ‘single package’ is an exception within Gaddis’ 
model. Gaddis indicates that if required, Washington could in rare cases resort to using 
coercion against Western partners.154 It is plausible that the Truman administration did 
believe that, at that particular time, coercive diplomacy to impose German rearmament was 
necessary. Because of the Korean War and increasing Soviet-Western tensions, it had 
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become imperative to immediately implement the NSC-68 program. Meanwhile, 
Washington considered German rearmament as a crucial component for an effective 
Western defense structure.155 Furthermore, NSC-68 warned that a considerable Western 
military buildup was necessary to rule out a decisive Soviet nuclear surprise attack by 
1954.156 These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency, its use of the ‘single 
package’ and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy in New York, to enforce European and especially 
French compliance with German rearmament. 
  Eventually, Jean Monnet, the initiator of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
created a compromise plan for German rearmament.157 On 24 October 1950, France 
presented the Pleven Plan, proposing FRG rearmament within a supranational European 
Army and a European defense organization. Accordingly, several scholars indicate, American 
pressure did succeed in inducing Paris to create a proposal for FRG rearmament.158 
 
Conclusion  
 
  The Truman administration’s incentive for the FRG’s reconstruction and rearmament 
arguably originated from the Containment strategy’s final goal, as formulated by Kennan, of 
creating an international order consisting of ‘independent centers of power,’ enabling 
threatened countries to withstand ‘Soviet pressure’ themselves.159 The Containment 
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strategy’s first step was, as Gaddis indicated, ‘restoration of the balance of power through 
the encouragement of self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism.’160 
Eventually, Washington’s efforts to initiate a European army, which would enable and 
control German rearmament while also containing the SU, can clearly be considered as 
American initiatives to restore the international ‘balance of power’ and develop Western 
Europe as an ‘independent center of power’ as part of its Containment strategy.161              
  As Gehrz concluded, ultimately Washington did succeed with Acheson’s coercive diplomacy 
to induce a French proposal for German rearmament: the Pleven Plan.162 Therefore, 
McAllister’s claim that Acheson’s controversial diplomacy to ‘sell’ the ‘single package’ was a 
harmful ‘premature effort’ is arguably unjustified and can instead be characterized as a 
necessary evil from Washington’s perspective, because it had ultimately generated the 
necessary momentum for tackling the German rearmament problem.163  
  Washington’s ‘single package’ and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy were certainly 
unconventional compared to Washington’s usual alliance diplomacy. However, contrary to 
Gehrz’s claim, it seems more probable that the ‘single package’ episode is an exception 
within ‘Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance management,’ which acknowledges 
that if required the US could adopt coercion against Western partners.164 It is plausible that 
the Truman administration did believe that coercive diplomacy to enforce German 
rearmament was imperative at that particular time of increased Cold War tensions. Because 
of the Korean War, Soviet-Western tensions and a possible Soviet nuclear surprise attack by 
1954, it was necessary to immediately implement NSC-68’s program. Meanwhile, 
Washington regarded German remilitarization to strengthen NATO’s defense of vital 
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importance.165 These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency, the ‘single package’ 
and Acheson’s coercive diplomatic strategy at the September 1950 NAC summit, to impose 
German rearmament on Europe. 
  Regarding the ‘single package’, Gehrz rightfully points out the predominance in the 
historiography of Acheson’s own account. Many of the historians discussed, except for 
McMahon and Beisner, uncritically agreed with Acheson that the JCS forced him to adopt 
the ‘single package’, using Acheson’s memoirs.166 Gehrz’s account of Acheson’s own crucial 
role in the ‘single package’ is arguably more plausible than the latter general 
historiographical claim.167 Declassified documents prove that it was actually the State 
Department and Acheson who determined decision-making on the ‘single package.’ 
Furthermore, several scholars convincingly indicated that Acheson fully supported the ‘single 
package’ as a valuable strategy during the New York NAC conference to impose German 
rearmament on European allies.168     
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  Eventually, it can be concluded that France was pressured by the US to initiate a plan for a 
European army, including FRG rearmament, when Acheson demanded such a force, as part 
of the ‘single package’, at NAC meetings in September 1950.169 However, Washington was 
not the first to introduce such a concept, because European allies already unsuccessfully 
discussed a European army including FRG divisions in August 1950.170 Nevertheless, on 24 
October 1950, France proposed the Pleven Plan, which ultimately culminated in the EDC.171    
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II. The French position on German Rearmament and European defense until 
the Pleven Plan 
 
France’s German policy before the September 1950 NAC  
 
  There is some disagreement in the historiography on French policy regarding Germany and 
the SU during the first Cold War years. Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that many 
scholars have argued that during this period French policy was intensely preoccupied with a 
perceived German threat, rather than the more direct Soviet threat,172 and that the 
fundamental French foreign policy goal was keeping Germany subdued.173 Consequently, the 
primary issue for French policy was the American-British determination to build up their 
zones of control in Germany.174   
  Washington and London adopted a ‘western strategy’ for West Germany, encompassing its 
eventual complete integration, including political, economic and eventually military 
integration into the postwar Western system.175 There is historiographical disagreement 
whether this ‘western strategy’ was imposed on France, as argued by for instance Alfred 
Grosser, Pierre Gerbet, and Michael Harrison, or whether the French sincerely supported it, 
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as argued by William Hitchcock (eventual support) and Creswell and Trachtenberg.176 Since 
halfway 1948, France increasingly maintained a more cooperative German policy with new 
‘European’ frameworks. Yet, Creswell and Trachtenberg maintain that many historians 
concluded that France’s essential policy goal had remained the same: keeping Germany 
subdued, especially concerning military affairs.177    
  Creswell and Trachtenberg question the validity of this ‘standard interpretation’, which also 
maintained that Paris fiercely resisted German rearmament in September 1950.178 They 
indicate that already in April 1945, Foreign Minister Bidault, General Charles de Gaulle, and 
additional French officials were quite anxious about ‘the Soviet threat.’179 Ultimately, 
Creswell and Trachtenberg conclude that France regarded ‘the Soviet threat’ as a more 
serious problem during the postwar period than Germany, although official French 
statements may indicate otherwise.180 
  Nevertheless, Germany remained another crucial French foreign policy issue. Creswell and 
Trachtenberg maintain many scholars acknowledged that France’s German policy 
particularly changed course after Bidault was succeeded by Schuman halfway 1948.181 
However, Hitchcock indicates that both men agreed that ‘closer Franco-German relations’ 
were required while maintaining the Allied occupation controls on Germany,182 and that 
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Bidault had a crucial role in initiating a French policy of reconciliation with the Germans.183 
Concerning the Berlin Blockade since June 1948, Washington increasingly tried to convince 
France that maintaining restrictions on West Germany’s development could generate 
German resentment and anti-Western sentiments.184 
  Yet, Creswell and Trachtenberg emphasize that the Western occupation powers largely 
agreed on the fundamental issues concerning Germany after WWII, claiming that there was   
Western consensus on ‘organizing’ western Germany and incorporating it into the Western 
alliance.185 Meanwhile, domestic political conditions often prevented France from adopting 
a clear anti-Soviet position and from publicly supporting the ‘western strategy’ for Germany 
between 1945 and 1950.186 Confrontation with the influential French Communist Party (PCF) 
could instigate a political crisis, and French officials even feared civil war.187 Creswell and 
Trachtenberg indicate that by 1947, after the PCF had quit government participation, France 
gradually started supporting the ‘western strategy’, concurring in 1948 with the FRG’s 
establishment.188    
  They also emphasize that French policymakers already concluded in 1947 that a Western 
repressive policy would ultimately be unable to retain Germany as a Western ally, and that a 
moderate Western policy for Germany would be more in line with France’s national 
interest.189 Consequently, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that insightful French officials 
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acknowledged the crucial premises concerning the ‘western strategy’, meaning that a 
structure founded on Germany’s separation and a moderate German policy would benefit 
France.190  
  Furthermore, Irwin Wall indicates that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned on July 
21, 1947, that a French obstructionist policy on Germany was not beneficial and instead 
advocated more German industrial development.191 From Washington’s perspective, France 
obstructing Germany’s development complicated maintaining Western European stability. 
Furthermore, Hitchcock indicates, it could interfere with its Containment strategy.192 
Particularly in the long run, French obstructionism on Germany would hamper the 
Containment strategy’s first step of restoring the international power equilibrium by 
stimulating self-confidence and economic reconstruction in countries ‘threatened by Soviet 
expansionism,’ such as West Germany.193  
  As Hitchcock indicates, to assuage Washington’s concerns regarding Germany’s 
development, French policymakers needed to present ‘a constructive alternative.’ 
Accordingly, ‘through active and constructive policies’ France tried to forestall any American-
British plans for entirely terminating the occupation regime’s controls over Germany’s 
sovereignty and economy.194 Hitchcock asserts that ‘from this diplomatic-strategic 
requirement’ evolved France’s growing insistence on Franco-German partnership since late 
1948.195 Creswell and Trachtenberg give a different explanation for this development, and 
argue that influential French officials believed the ‘western strategy’ might settle, relatively 
structurally, both ‘the Soviet problem’ and the German question. Therefore, Paris was 
                                                          
190 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 14; Massigli to Bidault, 8 July 1947, in MAE, 
René Massigli Papers, Vol. 92; and Coulet (head of the Direction d’Europe) to Massigli, 31 October 1947, in 
MAE, René Massigli Papers, Vol. 96. 
191 However, the Quai d'Orsay wanted several assurances in return: a ban on strategic industries in west 
Germany, for France a guaranteed and adequate supply of coal and assistance for its steel industry, and finally 
that the Ruhr would be internationally administered. Wall, The Making of Postwar France, 79; MAE, Y 
Internationale, 1944—49, Conversations Anglo—Américaines, July 21, 1947. 
192 Hitchcock, France Restored, 100; and CIA Report, ‘Political Trends in Western Germany,’ July 22, 1948, 
President’s Secretary’s Files, box 255, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL. 
193 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 35, 54-55. Quotation is from page 35.  
194 Hitchcock, France Restored, 100. 
195 Ibid. 
36 
 
progressively willing to accept the ‘western strategy.’196 For instance, on February 19, 1948, 
Secretary of State Marshall argued that French defense against the Soviet threat required 
integrating Western Europe, western Germany included.197 Creswell and Trachtenberg 
indicate that both Schuman and Bidault concurred with Marshall’s analysis.198 
  Since late 1948, Hitchcock indicates, French policymakers suggested integrating Germany’s 
economy with the Western European economy ‘in a controlled, politically balanced, and 
economically liberal environment.’199 Meanwhile, in case Germany remained separated, 
Soviet and Western troops would also remain in Germany. Particularly the American military 
presence would give France additional protection against both Germany and the SU. 
Creswell and Trachtenberg argue it was principally because this ‘Cold War political system’ 
served French interests, that Paris agreed with Washington concerning the fundamental 
issues on Germany.200  
  Ultimately, Creswell and Trachtenberg conclude that fundamentally ‘Western policy [on 
Germany] was consensual,’ before the German rearmament debate from September 1950 
onwards. They also assert that Paris was not somehow forced to accept a US policy for 
Germany which France totally opposed.201 However, their conclusion is incompatible with 
Hitchcock’s account of France’s German policy. Hitchcock argues that the French strategy 
since late 1948 for close Franco-German economic partnership was inimical to British 
national interests.202 When France started developing European integration plans involving 
Germany, London objected because it feared France wanted ‘a continental alternative to a 
British-led Atlantic community.’203 Furthermore, Hitchcock maintains, because France 
needed to strengthen its international position, French officials were compelled to devise an 
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alternative vision on the German problem. Consequently, Hitchcock argues, by adopting 
European integration France tried to claim a position ‘as the de facto arbiter of European 
economic reconstruction,’204 which could counterbalance its huge diplomatic disadvantages  
because of French military and economic reliance on London and Washington.205    
  As Wall indicates, the Quai d’Orsay concluded in August 1947 that because France 
depended on American aid, Paris was forced to make concessions on its German policy.206 
Although Wall and Hitchcock maintain that Paris understood it was in France’s own interest 
to adopt a moderate German policy, their accounts still indicate that France was in a certain 
way forced to accept a US policy for Germany which it not fully supported.207 Although 
Creswell and Trachtenberg may be right that France did not ‘deeply disapprove’ of 
Washington’s German policy, France certainly did not enthusiastically support it either.208 As 
Hitchcock indicates, Bidault and Schuman wanted stronger Franco-German cooperation 
while making sure that the Allied occupation controls remained active, while Washington 
wanted to lift most of those restrictions at short notice.209 
  Ultimately, France did acknowledge that it was probably best to adopt the ‘western 
strategy’ for Germany. However, it did not have much choice either because of its own weak 
international position, as indicated by Wall and Hitchcock.210 For France there was no viable 
alternative for the ‘western strategy’, which led Paris, as Hitchcock concluded, to embrace it 
by adopting European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, reinforce France’s 
economic reconstruction and increase French power in international relations.211 Therefore, 
contrary to Creswell and Trachtenberg’s argument, France was arguably somewhat forced to 
accept Washington’s German policy. 
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  However, their conclusion that there was Western consensus on the fundamental notion of 
‘organizing’ western Germany and integrating it into the West, is arguably right.212 
Nonetheless, Western policy on Germany on other relating fundamental issues was not 
consensual before September 1950, because of British opposition to France’s European 
integration schemes involving Germany and France’s determination to maintain Allied 
occupation controls on Germany, which the US wanted to lift.213 Another indication is Wall’s 
conclusion that Washington’s Marshall Plan was partly created for finally achieving French 
agreement with German economic redevelopment.214   
 
France’s position on German rearmament until the Pleven Plan  
 
  French officials acknowledged that eventually it would be impossible to treat Germany as a 
true Western ally, except if it would regain national sovereignty.215 Yet, according to official 
André François-Poncet, dealing with the German problem was ‘all a question of time.’216 
Creswell and Trachtenberg argue this was an adequate representation of France’s 
fundamental concern: the pace of Germany’s integration into Western Europe, and how this 
should be controlled.217 The principal reasons for this French position were concerns 
regarding German power, domestic political considerations including Communism, and 
concerns about possible Soviet responses to integrating Germany into the West.218       
  As Creswell maintains, Monnet and like-minded French policymakers originally argued FRG 
remilitarization could only be realized within an Atlantic structure with US participation, and 
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not in a European framework.219 Accordingly, Creswell demonstrates, in August 1950 two 
French memoranda advocated an expanded American military presence in Germany and 
nearly complete Atlantic military integration.220 However, as Creswell indicates, both 
memoranda merely proposed non-military German contributions to NATO’s defense. 
Eventually, Washington’s rejection of these initiatives compelled Monnet to abandon his 
‘Atlantic army’ plans and to focus on a European army.221   
  As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, there is a general historical interpretation that 
France strongly resisted the concept of German rearmament, particularly at the September 
1950 NAC Conference.222 For example, Large argues that ‘only when a “minimum level” of 
[NATO] rearmament had been reached,’ France might reconsider rejecting German 
remilitarization.223 Hitchcock agrees and asserts that in New York, Schuman declined to 
accept ‘the principle of German participation’ in a Western integrated force.224 Hitchcock 
also maintains that despite the NAC’s concluding statement ‘announced agreement on the 
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integrated force concept, the French blocked any decision on Germany’s role within it.’225 
This issue was postponed until NATO’s Defense Committee meetings in October 1950.226    
  However, Creswell indicates, ‘Schuman did not’ explicitly and officially ‘reject the German 
rearmament proposal in principle’ at the concluding NAC meeting on 26 September 1950.227 
Furthermore, already in August 1950, Quai d’Orsay officials cautioned that Paris could not 
impede FRG rearmament supported by the US. As Gehrz indicates, in their view the worst 
possible development would be the FRG’s rearmament ‘as an American fait accompli 
without French involvement.’228 Therefore, these officials reluctantly suggested that the 
French should take the initiative in the upcoming NAC-discussions by introducing a scheme 
for rigidly controlled German rearmament.229 Gehrz also indicates that Schuman informed 
Britain and the US that France not was not opposed in principle to rearming Germany and 
wanted a compromise, before and throughout the NAC meetings.230    
  Creswell and Trachtenberg claim ‘the French did accept the principle of a West German 
contribution’ to Western defense.231 Referring to a French memorandum dated November 4, 
1950, they conclude that the general view that the French resolution and American 
resolution for German rearmament were ‘contradictory’ had been incorrect.232 This 
document asserted both countries countries had agreed with the ‘principle of forward 
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defense,’233 defending Western Europe ‘as far to the east as possible.’234 Because this 
included West Germany, both had concluded that Bonn should contribute to Western 
defense. Consequently, the document concluded that there was ‘an agreement on the 
principle of “German rearmament.”’235    
  During October 1950 NATO Defense Committee meetings, Moch confirmed that France 
agreed with the principle of establishing FRG forces, ‘integrated into European Divisions.’236 
Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, Schuman repeated in December 1950 the 
French government’s fundamental position regarding German rearmament, that ‘it was 
really only a question of timing,’ starting with increasing NATO’s military power before 
deciding on FRG rearmament.237 Schuman also maintained France ‘did not object to the 
principle of German participation’ in Western Europe’s defense.238 Accordingly, Creswell and 
Trachtenberg conclude France’s fundamental position was that it would accept FRG 
rearmament ‘once the Western bloc had built up its own power.’239 
  Meanwhile, since 1948 the French military advocated swiftly remilitarizing West Germany, 
to counterbalance the Soviets and because it believed Bonn should contribute militarily to its 
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own defense.240 As Creswell indicates, Colonel Paul Stehlin warned that ‘a Germany that 
remained neutralized and demilitarized would soon fall under Soviet dependence.’241 
However, although many French civilian officials swiftly accepted the notion of an FRG 
military contribution, they wanted to proceed slowly. Nevertheless, as Creswell indicates, 
‘their primary concern was how to control German rearmament, not how to prevent it.’242 
Meanwhile, the Pleven Plan was developed without consulting any military or Quai d’Orsay 
officials. The French military, Creswell maintains, considered it militarily incompetent, 
installing inadmissible supranational limitations on the French military’s usability while not 
efficiently utilizing the FRG’s military capability.243 Ultimately, French civil-military 
disagreement on timing and method of German rearmament would increase considerably 
during the ongoing EDC debate.244  
 
Historiography on French acceptance of German rearmament  
 
  Cogan agrees with Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that France’s postwar German policy 
was more aligned with Anglo-American intentions than other scholars commonly 
acknowledged. However, he claims they ‘give too much emphasis to the support of it.’245 
Cogan agrees there were two French primary concerns during this period which ‘coexisted’: 
possible Soviet military expansionism and preoccupation with a German threat. He also 
argues that France started regarding the ‘western strategy’ as a useful instrument for 
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containing both the SU and Germany.246 Still, Cogan argues, France ‘never abandoned its 
long-term goal of finally bringing Germany to heel.’247 
  Hitchcock maintains Creswell and Trachtenberg’s argument cannot be considered ‘a 
departure from the “conventional wisdom,”’ because earlier published research already 
concluded that France’s German policy ‘was not obstructionist’ and that Bidault and 
Schuman followed a mainly ‘pro-Western policy’ for promoting French aims.248 Hitchcock 
also disagrees with their claim that French leaders considered the Soviet threat more critical 
than the German problem. Instead, Hitchcock stresses ‘the dual nature of the threat’ during 
1945-1948 and that for France ‘both were urgent.’249     
  Creswell and Trachtenberg maintain that for Paris only after a Western defense framework 
was created that could incorporate German units and could withstand the Soviet response, 
German rearmament would be acceptable.250 They also argue that the French government 
reacted to American pressure for rapidly rearming Germany with an alternative: the Pleven 
Plan proposing a supranational European army that would integrate units from prospective 
ECSC members.251 Hitchcock agrees that France was instigated by Washington to propose its 
own plan for enabling FRG rearmament, because it needed ‘to counter a more direct 
American plan to rearm the FRG.’252 He also argues this EDC plan succeeded in achieving its 
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aim: ‘it fended off the American alternative of West German national rearmament and 
delayed the entire undertaking.’253  
  Mark Sheetz maintains Schuman eventually accepted ‘West German defense contributions 
“in principle,”’ in September 1950 ‘because, for the French, en principe connotes a purely 
hypothetical proposition with a low probability of realization.’254 Furthermore, Sheetz 
indicates, Schuman had orders not to agree with an FRG role ‘in practice.’ Sheetz also 
observes that halfway the September 1950 CFM in New York, the French Government 
collectively agreed that German remilitarization would produce serious risks without 
considerably improving ‘French security’255; accordingly, FRG participation should be 
restricted ‘essentially, if not exclusively to the economic sphere.’256 This seems to contradict 
Schuman’s conciliatory NAC remarks, that ‘he was not fundamentally opposed to German 
rearmament.’257  
  Paris possibly adopted this aforementioned position, as Sheetz implies, because it believed 
German rearmament at that particular time would be harmful to French security 
interests.258 As Creswell argues, this does not necessarily mean that France definitely ruled 
out German rearmament. Meanwhile, the US had major influence on French decision-
making, because if France would dismiss Washington’s condition for economic assistance, 
FRG rearmament, Western defense cooperation concerning Europe could collapse.259 
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Consequently, Creswell argues, Paris ‘designed the Pleven Plan (…) to delay [German] 
rearmament until a more opportune moment.’260      
  Similarly, Sheetz argues that with the Pleven Plan France was ‘simply playing for time.’261 
French policymakers recognized that if France was too obstructionist towards American-
British policies, Paris risked being excluded from decision-making on Germany. For instance, 
Sheetz refers to Armand Bérard’s assessment that if France could not prevent German 
rearmament, the best strategy for damage control would be to engage in the debate and 
urge that French conditions would be met. Therefore, France had to propose a constructive 
alternative, resulting in the Pleven Plan.262 
 
Conclusion 
 
  There is certainly historiographical disagreement on France’s German policy and its policy 
regarding the SU during the first Cold War years. As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, 
many historians have argued that French policy was strongly preoccupied with a perceived 
German threat, rather than the more imminent Soviet threat.263 Therefore, a crucial problem 
for Paris was the American-British conviction to reconstruct Germany and adopt the 
‘western strategy’, encompassing West Germany’s complete integration into the postwar 
Western system.264 Furthermore, there is historiographical disagreement whether this 
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‘western strategy’ was imposed on France, or whether the French genuinely supported it.265 
Eventually, since halfway 1948, France implemented a more cooperative German policy. 
However, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, many scholars concluded France’s principal 
foreign policy goal remained keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military 
affairs.266    
  Ultimately, Creswell and Trachtenberg’s conclusion that fundamentally ‘Western policy [on 
Germany] was consensual’ before the September 1950 NAC, is not convincing.267 Although 
their argument of Western consensus on the fundamental notion of ‘organizing’ western 
Germany and integrating it into the Western alliance, is arguably right,268 Western policy 
concerning Germany on other closely relating crucial issues was not consensual before 
September 1950. As Hitchcock indicates, France’s obstructionist policy concerning 
Germany’s reconstruction, especially before summer 1948, could interfere with 
Washington’s Containment strategy.269 It can be concluded that particularly in the long run, 
French obstructionism on Germany would frustrate the Containment strategy’s first stage of 
restoring the international power equilibrium by stimulating self-confidence and economic 
reconstruction in countries ‘threatened by Soviet expansionism.’270 Other examples that 
Western policy on Germany was not consensual are, as Hitchcock shows, that London 
objected to French initiatives for European integration involving Germany, and that France 
insisted on maintaining the Allied occupation controls on Germany while the US wanted a 
strongly liberalized occupation regime.271  
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  Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg argue that Paris was not somehow forced to 
accept a US policy for Germany which France totally opposed.272 Both Hitchcock and Wall 
also maintain that Paris comprehended it was in France’s self-interest to conduct a 
moderate policy towards Germany.273 Nevertheless, eventually France did not have much 
choice in accepting the ‘western strategy’, primarily because of its weak international 
position, its dependence on US aid, and lack of a viable alternative, as Wall and Hitchcock 
indicated.274 This implies that France was at least to a certain extent forced to accept 
Washington’s policy for Germany.  
  Although Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that France did not ‘deeply disapprove’ of 
Washington’s German policy seems plausible, Paris certainly did not completely support it 
either.275 A crucial problem that remained was Allied disagreement concerning the 
occupation controls on Germany.276 Yet, Hitchcock concluded, Paris finally adopted 
European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, reinforce France’s economic 
reconstruction and increase French power in international relations.277  
  As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicated, because of the Soviet threat, French officials 
agreed with the ‘western strategy’ and that repression would eventually be unable to 
preserve Germany as a Western ally.278 Meanwhile, another important French concern was 
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how Moscow would respond to this ‘western strategy.’279 Yet, it can be concluded that 
keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, indeed remained France’s 
primary objective of its German policy. For instance, French official François Seydoux insisted 
by September 1950 that Germany should be prevented from regaining sovereignty in 
military affairs, because ‘European integration itself was endangered’ by German 
rearmament.280     
  As Creswell indicated, Paris actually preferred Atlantic defense agreements for rearming 
Germany.281 However, that France proposed in August 1950 Atlantic integration with 
exclusively non-military German contributions to Western defense,282 clearly indicates that 
the French government did not favor German rearmament at that time. A crucial motive for 
French acceptance of the principle of rearming Germany was that if Washington would 
proceed without French engagement, France could no longer maintain control over 
Germany’s development.283 Accordingly, Sheetz indicates, the strategy of French 
policymakers was participating constructively in the German rearmament debate, but urge 
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that French conditions would be met, such as the continued American military presence in 
Germany.284  
  Eventually, Schuman did not officially reject the principle of rearming the FRG at the 
concluding NAC-meeting on September 26, 1950.285 Also supporting Creswell and 
Trachtenberg’s argument that France ‘did accept the principle of a West German 
contribution’ to Western defense,286 is that preceding and during this NAC conference 
Schuman declared that he was not against FRG rearmament and wanted a compromise.287 
The NAC concluded in New York that ‘the nature, extent and timing of German participation’ 
in Western defense would be discussed with Bonn.288 This arguably implies that France had 
already accepted a German military contribution. Furthermore, NATO’s Defense Committee 
would make ‘specific recommendations,’ concerning Germany’s defense contribution to an 
integrated force for Europe.289 Contradicting Hitchcock’s claim, this suggests France did not 
reject ‘the principle of German participation’ in this integrated force. Otherwise France 
would not have approved this NAC concluding statement.290 In October 1950, France indeed 
agreed with the principle of establishing FRG forces ‘integrated into European Divisions.’291 
Moreover, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicated, a November 4 French memorandum 
concluded, because France accepted the ‘principle of forward defense’292 and an FRG 
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military contribution, that there was ‘an agreement on the principle of “German 
rearmament.”’293    
  The French approach to German rearmament was in Schuman’s words that ‘it was really 
only a question of timing,’ and first increasing NATO’s military power before deciding on FRG 
rearmament.294 However, the French military advocated quickly rearming Germany since 
1948.295 Eventually, because for France the German threat and the Soviet threat were so 
closely related, Hitchcock’s emphasis on ‘the dual nature of the threat’ and that ‘both were 
urgent,’296 is more convincing than Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that Paris regarded 
the Soviet threat a considerably bigger issue.297 Nevertheless, Creswell and Trachtenberg do 
convincingly conclude that France’s fundamental position was that only when a Western 
defense organization had been created powerful enough for incorporating FRG units and 
coping with the Soviet response, regulated FRG rearmament would be viable.298    
  As Creswell indicated, many French officials concurred that Germany should be rearmed for 
counterbalancing Soviet military superiority.299 Eventually, because France faced 
considerable American pressure to accept German rearmament with the ‘single package’ 
and feared that the US Congress would cut American aid,300 it responded with a constructive 
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alternative: the Pleven Plan for a supranational European army, culminating in the EDC.301 
Therefore it can be concluded, as argued by Creswell and Trachtenberg, Sheetz, and 
Hitchcock, that France was instigated by the Truman administration to develop an 
alternative plan for rearming the FRG, to prevent Washington’s rearmament plans and for 
trying to postpone it.302  
  Eventually it can be concluded, like many scholars argued before, that keeping Germany 
subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, remained France’s primary objective of its 
German policy.303 Accordingly, it can be argued that this was the primary reason for the 
French government to try to delay German rearmament, rather than Creswell and 
Trachtenberg’s suggestion that first the West should be ‘strong enough to withstand the 
Soviet reaction,’ which was nevertheless also a crucial factor.304 Supporting the former 
argument is Victor Gavin’s observation that Monnet’s ‘Pleven Plan’ should solve three 
interrelated French problems concurrently: rearming Germany, protecting the Schuman 
Plan, and keeping Germany restrained.305 These issues, and Hitchcock’s claim that the EDC 
achieved its objective, obstructing the American plan of ‘West German national 
rearmament’ and stall the whole enterprise, will be investigated in chapter three.306  
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III. The United States’ intended aim and the French intended aim with the 
EDC 
 
The ECSC and German rearmament 
 
  When Acheson declared in September 1950 that rearming Germany and German NATO-
membership was a fundamental requirement for Washington’s commitment to Western 
Europe’s security, the French regarded this as dangerous for their German policy.307 Paris 
recognized that Bonn had agreed with the Schuman Plan primarily because it seemed the 
only possibility for Germany’s international rehabilitation and would grant the FRG equal 
rights as other ECSC member states.308  
  The Truman administration now appeared to be providing Germany another option for 
regaining sovereignty, by joining NATO and granting the privilege to have an army, but with 
less autonomy than other NATO members.309 France therefore feared that Bonn might 
abandon the ECSC-project, and that German rearmament could preclude creating the 
Schuman Plan’s ‘Franco-German framework.’310 As Hitchcock observed, Seydoux and 
Monnet warned in September 1950 that if Germany started to believe remilitarization would 
grant Germany equal sovereignty as other European nations, Bonn would lose interest in 
European integration.311 Although the Schuman Plan was officially presented on May 9, 
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1950, the ECSC negotiations were still ongoing when the ‘single package’ proposal was 
made.312  
  Already prior to the September 1950 NAC, Gavin indicates, Monnet reminded Prime 
Minister Pleven and Schuman that ‘the Schuman Plan was France’s German policy,’ and was 
necessary for eliminating Germany’s competitive advantage over French industry. Therefore, 
FRG rearmament could only be considered within the supranational ECSC structure.313 As 
Hitchcock demonstrated, both Monnet and Seydoux maintained that French flexibility 
concerning German rearmament ‘would buy time’ to conclude the ECSC negotiations. 
Consequently, this would ensure that the FRG could not exploit remilitarization for 
enhancing its political status in negotiations with Western allies.314 Gavin also indicates that 
the Quai d’Orsay maintained that the German rearmament issue was less important than 
the fundamental French objective: that Germany could not regain full sovereignty.315  
  The Schuman Declaration claimed ‘it was the first step towards a European federation,’ 
making another Franco-German war inconceivable.316 The Schuman Plan would establish ‘a 
new framework’ of Franco-German relations, installing a common market for coal and steel 
supervised by a supranational European institution. Accordingly, Gavin indicates, the issue of 
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French industry lacking competitiveness would be settled, while securing the foundation for 
France’s future economic development.317     
  The previous chapters already gave a detailed account of Schuman’s position on German 
rearmament in New York. Schuman originally wanted a confidential understanding on 
German rearmament.318 There were several reasons why France adopted such a careful 
approach to German remilitarization. Because Germany invaded France during the Franco-
Prussian War, and in both World Wars, this was obviously controversial.319 Accordingly, 
Schuman told Acheson in September 1950 that merely ‘a minority in France appreciates the 
importance of Germany in western defense.’320 Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg 
indicate that Monnet ‘wanted the rearmament issue put on hold until the ECSC treaty was 
signed,’321 because in Hitchcock’s words ‘the prospect of German rearmament threatened 
France’s entire postwar strategy of recovery’ and jeopardized the Schuman Plan’s controls 
on Germany.322 However, Creswell and Trachtenberg argue that France dreaded most a 
Soviet military response to FRG rearmament. Moscow announced in December 1950 that it 
would neither accept a German national army, nor FRG rearmament.323  
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  By September 1950 Bonn had adopted a tougher position on the ECSC, which Monnet 
blamed on Western speculations on German rearmament.324 Therefore, Gavin indicates, 
Monnet summarized three conceivable courses for Paris, while strongly recommending the 
third one. The first course was ‘do nothing.’325 Second was ‘treat Germany on a national 
basis.’ Third was ‘integrate Germany within Europe through a broader Schuman Plan.’326   
  Meanwhile, because only France opposed immediate FRG rearmament in New York, it 
faced considerable NATO pressure. As Creswell indicates, because of a crucial French defeat 
at Lang-Son during France’s war in Indochina in October 1950, its international position was 
additionally weakened.327 The government responded by giving the Indochina War ‘absolute 
priority,’ thereby weakening France’s European military position.328 Therefore, Creswell 
maintains, the French military was convinced that German rearmament to forestall Soviet 
aggression had become even more imperative.329   
 
The Pleven Plan’s creation 
 
  Regarding how the EDC-concept was conceived, Weisbrode indicates that it first emerged 
‘in parallel conversations on the one hand between Monnet, Bruce, and Tomlinson, and, on 
the other, between Hank Byroade, McCloy (…) Bob Bowie and Dean Acheson, in the spring 
and summer of 1950.’330 Eventually, Weisbrode maintains, the Monnet-discussions 
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produced the essence of the Pleven Plan, but the EDC should not be regarded ‘as primarily 
an American initiative,’ because most of the EDC’s ‘early support had been in France.’331  
  On October 6, 1950, the French government analyzed the American plan for German 
rearmament through a ‘European defense force’ but postponed adopting any decision. 
Finally, Monnet advised Schuman and Pleven on October 16, 1950, to present an alternative 
French plan involving German rearmament.332 Monnet argued Washington’s current policy 
had to be firmly resisted, but this required a constructive French position ‘inspired by an 
overall policy for Europe.’333 
  What was the French intended aim with the EDC? Monnet worried that French opposition 
to FRG rearmament would eventually be pointless and would cause crucial damage to the 
Schuman Plan.334 Accordingly, Gavin indicates, Monnet’s ‘Pleven Plan’ should solve three 
interrelated French problems concurrently: rearming Germany, protecting the Schuman 
Plan, and keeping Germany restrained.335 It envisioned a ‘supranational European army’, 
consisting of divisions from prospective ECSC member states combined ‘at the level of the 
smallest possible unit.’336 Wall maintains that the Pleven Plan ‘meant to subordinate the 
German military to French overall command.’337 Creswell argues it intended to keep France’s 
military unchanged while carving up German forces into small contingents. This condition 
was required for achieving French parliamentary authorization.338 The Pleven Plan also 
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proposed European army supervision by a supranational institution. However, Gavin notes, 
this created a serious political issue, because it required establishing a European political 
authority, a ‘European civil power.’339  
  Ultimately the French government approved the Pleven Plan on October 21, 1950. This 
plan, Gavin indicates, would enable Paris to obstruct the ‘single package’ with a defense 
scheme built on those principles that the US was advocating for Europe; promoting 
European integration by closer military, economic and political cooperation.340 If the Pleven 
Plan would be accepted by Western allies, Gavin notes, France could maintain considerable 
control over the pace of the FRG’s remilitarization. Meanwhile, the Pleven Plan would 
reinforce the Schuman Plan, which enabled France to maintain control over the FRG’s 
industrial development. Finally, the National Assembly also agreed with the Pleven Plan on 
October 26, 1950.341     
 
The Spofford Plan as an American-French compromise on German rearmament 
 
  The Truman administration’s response regarding the Pleven Plan had been supportive. 
However, American officials also had considerable objections.342 On October 27, 1950, Moch 
called Secretary Marshall to present the Pleven Plan. Moch explained that ‘only after 
completion Schuman Plan,’ a European Defense Minister would be assigned, accountable to 
a European Assembly.343 The European army would be directed by a Supreme Commander. 
Eventually German units could be established, however ‘only up to company or battalion 
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strength.’344 France ruled out German divisions because it feared they would constitute the 
start of a national army, thus ignoring American requests for twelve German divisions.345    
  Acheson concluded that the Pleven Plan appeared to assign Germany ‘permanently second 
class status.’ Accordingly, Acheson considered it ‘wholly unworkable’ and unacceptable to 
Bonn.346 On 3 November 1950, Acheson warned that if France would insist on the Pleven 
Plan’s acceptance ‘as interpreted by Moch,’ NATO-agreement would be impossible and 
Washington would have to review its European defense policy.347 Remarkably, Acheson 
claimed the ‘single package’ was not ‘a take-it-or-leave-it proposition,’ but that Washington 
has been and continues to be willing to ‘modify it just as long as the results makes mil 
[military] sense and will prove acceptable’ to NATO and Germany.348 Although this may be 
true for after the September 1950 NAC summit, during this conference Acheson was quite 
insistent on sticking to the ‘single package.’    
  Eventually, the Western Allies reached agreement on establishing a European army and by 
late November 1950 an American-French compromise on rearming West Germany was 
achieved. Washington wanted a ‘provisional or transitional agreement’ on German 
rearmament, which resulted in ‘the Spofford Plan.’349 Accordingly, Schwartz observed, 
Washington would concur with ‘the regimental combat team of between 5,000 and 6,000 
men as the initial size of the German units.’350 Meanwhile, Paris would abandon its 
precondition that FRG units could enter the European army only after this force was up and 
running. Furthermore, German units would never make up more than one fifth of the 
European force.351 Finally, the US would proceed with sending a Supreme Commander for 
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commanding NATO. General Dwight David Eisenhower was the preferred candidate for this 
position.352  
  Acheson pleaded with Schuman to accept the Spofford Plan. Remarkably, Beisner observed 
that because Spofford advised exchanging a US Supreme Commander and additional 
American divisions for Europe, ‘for a French commitment to the principle of German 
rearmament,’ Acheson was ‘categorically abandoning the single package.’353 Furthermore, 
Acheson stressed Washington’s support concerning European integration, and asked 
Schuman to take charge of establishing a European army. France finally agreed with the 
Spofford Plan halfway December 1950.354                         
  During the December 18-19 NAC meetings in Brussels, the Spofford Plan was officially 
accepted and two different tracks of negotiations were scheduled. Near Bonn, the Allied 
High Commission would consider strengthening NATO by obtaining a German defense 
contribution.355 Meanwhile, France would organize discussions in Paris concerning creating a 
European force. As Creswell indicates, this particular ‘two-track approach’ enabled 
Washington to proceed with bolstering NATO regardless of the Paris negotiations’ results.356  
Schuman also received American promises that reconsidering Germany’s Occupation Statute 
would not result in full German sovereignty and that discussions with Moscow on Germany 
were still optional.357 Furthermore, Creswell indicates, NATO reached agreement on ‘a 
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forward defense strategy that ensured German participation,’358 the creation of a SACEUR, 
Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR,359 and on an ‘integrated NATO defense force.’360 
  Crucially, the concluding NATO report made a clear distinction between the 
‘Integrated NATO Defense Force’ and a ‘European Defense Force.’ The former was defined 
as ‘a force (…) in which each nation retains political and certain military controls over its own 
forces.’ The EDF’s definition was: ‘a composite force composed of contributions by two or 
more nations under the political control of a European body.’361 The EDF could ‘be an 
element’ of this NATO force.362 Moreover, Germany’s contribution could be realized by 
participation in a ‘European defense force’, or via directly contributing to this NATO force.363  
  French officials recognized that rearming the FRG was unavoidable, yet they understood 
that the French National Assembly would vigorously oppose it. Nevertheless, Hitchcock 
claims that the EDC accomplished the objective for which it was created: ‘it fended off the 
American alternative of West German national rearmament and delayed the entire 
undertaking.’364 As Hitchcock indicates, when the EDC-Treaty was rejected in August 1954, 
Adenauer had proven to be pro-European, the FRG had become a cooperative ECSC-member 
since the ECSC-Treaty was signed in April 1951 and started operating in August 1952,365 and 
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Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was deceased. Consequently, Hitchcock argues, German 
remilitarization ‘had lost its force as a domestic political issue in France.’366  
  Eventually, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France agreed to a final arrangement late 
1954, accepting the FRG’s rearmament and its NATO-membership in return for controls on 
Bonn’s sovereignty concerning military affairs. Hitchcock maintains this arrangement 
succeeded in realizing all France’s primary goals, but without specifying those objectives (in 
that particular article).367 Yet, it can be argued that with this Western arrangement on 
German rearmament, France did succeed in realizing its objectives of containing both the 
FRG and the SU (to a certain extent), not provoking Soviet intervention by prematurely 
rearming the FRG and postponing it until NATO had sufficiently rearmed itself to deter Soviet 
aggression, not prematurely provoking French (anti-German) public opinion, and finally 
prevent Germany from regaining full sovereignty, including in military affairs.368 However, 
Hitchcock indicates, French officials did not have a well-developed strategy in advance to 
achieve this final arrangement.369        
  Supporting Hitchcock’s claim that with the EDC Paris wanted to keep at bay Washington’s 
plan of FRG ‘national rearmament’ and postpone German rearmament,370 is Creswell’s 
account of a crucial French military meeting on December 16, 1950. During this meeting, 
Moch stressed that Bonn should not be allowed to rearm ‘while Western forces are still not 
ready.’371 French officials implied they would agree with FRG rearmament, once NATO was 
militarily powerful enough. Once again, Creswell indicates, French officials declared that 
immediate German rearmament might provoke a powerful Soviet response. Therefore, 
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Creswell maintains, France believed that Western allies had to proceed slowly with German 
rearmament.372         
 
The EDC’s ratification process  
 
  By February 1951, the six countries participating in the ECSC negotiations started a 
concurrent intergovernmental conference for founding the EDC. Because the British had 
objections of principle to supranationalism, they refused to participate.373 Eventually, by 
summer 1951, supporting the EDC became formal US government policy with NSC-115, with 
Washington wishing that the Paris Conference on the EDC would succeed.374  
  McAllister argues there are two fundamental reasons that caused Washington to back the 
EDC’s establishment.375 First, powerful officials, such as McCloy and Bruce, convincingly 
contended that the EDC’s supranationalism was the only option to accommodate French 
concerns about FRG rearmament and Bonn’s demand ‘that it would only rearm on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.’376 As McAllister indicates, Bonn would refuse to ‘accept 
discriminatory conditions in an alliance of sovereign states such as NATO.’ However, it would 
agree with ‘[nondiscriminatory] restrictions within a European institutional framework,’ for 
all participating states.377 Contrary to NATO, McAllister argues, the EDC might solve the 
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current deadlock over FRG remilitarization, but also ‘recast the political future of Europe by 
placing French and German military affairs under’ supranational control.378 
  The second fundamental reason, McAllister maintains, why the EDC eventually surpassed 
the NATO option, was Eisenhower’s ‘considerable authority’ supporting the EDC.379 By June 
1951, Monnet and Bruce had convinced Eisenhower, at that time NATO’s first SACEUR, to 
support the EDC.380 A crucial problem for the EDC was that military officials consistently 
regarded a European army as impracticable. However, McAllister argues, ‘Eisenhower’s 
support decisively silenced all criticism of the plan on this basis.’381 This statement seems 
rather over-simplified. Concerning the EDC, Creswell maintains that because of Eisenhower’s 
excellent military reputation ‘others found it exceedingly difficult to oppose him on issues of 
national security.’382 Yet, Creswell’s account implies that there was still criticism among 
American officials concerning the EDC.   
  Weisbrode indicates that despite Eisenhower, US President since January 20, 1953, strongly 
supported the EDC, ‘there was more confusion than conviction, notably outside EUR [The 
State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs]’ in the US.383 The Pentagon wanted German 
rearmament ‘but mistrusted “jerry built” schemes like the EDC.’384 Meanwhile, McAllister 
argues, Eisenhower mainly backed the EDC because it could ‘enable Western Europe to 
emerge as an integrated unit’ capable of durable self-defense ‘without an American military 
presence.’385 Accordingly, McAllister maintains, Eisenhower’s intended aim with the EDC was 
achieving US military withdrawal from Europe. Eventually, the EDC’s founding treaty was 
signed on May 27, 1952, in Paris by all ECSC member states.386 One day before, the Treaty of 
Bonn was signed which terminated the Allied High Commission and Occupation Statute, and 
effectively reinstated the FRG’s sovereignty. However, the ‘Contractual Agreements’ still 
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imposed limits, because the FRG could not; drive out Western forces, sign a German-Soviet 
peace treaty, adjust its borders, or frustrate ‘Western access to Berlin.’ The Treaty of Bonn 
would also be subordinate to the EDC-Treaty.387         
  A crucial question that remains is what was the United States’ intended aim with the EDC? 
McAllister maintains the EDC was developed to make FRG remilitarization more tolerable for 
France and was the foundation of Washington’s attempts to establish Western European 
integration: ‘many American policymakers saw it as the key element in the rebirth of Europe 
and in winning the Cold War.’388 As Creswell indicates, Washington desired transforming the 
FRG ‘into a military and political bulwark against Soviet Communism,’389 something the EDC 
could arguably enable.  
  As McAllister indicates, that Washington considered the EDC crucially important is 
supported by several US policy decisions, such as Washington’s indifference towards the 
Stalin Note dated March 10, 1952, which suggested reuniting Germany. Essentially, 
McAllister argues, the Truman administration did not want anything to disrupt the EDC-
Treaty’s endorsement,390 while the Eisenhower administration would not seek ‘a general 
Cold War settlement’ after Stalin’s death, because this could obstruct EDC-Treaty 
ratification.391                 
  Besides pragmatism, McAllister argues that both US administrations principally backed the 
EDC because they were convinced ‘it represented the best long-term solution to the German 
problem.’392 NSC-160/1, adopted on August 13, 1953, provides some explanation: 
‘the EDC was a vital ingredient in the national policy toward Germany as it “is designed to 
harmonize three aims:(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) 
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the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the 
cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.”’393 Pruessen maintains this EDC-
characterization ‘was often Eisenhower’s personal message as well.’394 Meanwhile, Creswell 
argues that when Washington demanded FRG rearmament within a ‘European defense 
force’, it had three objectives. First, contain and overturn ‘Soviet power and influence.’395 
Second, reduce Washington’s ‘share of the financial and military burden’ concerning 
Europe’s defense. And third, secure the FRG ‘firmly in the Western sphere of influence.’396 
Finally, McAllister argues, both US administrations regarded the EDC as a crucial factor ‘in 
transforming the basic power structure of the international system.’397  
  McAllister indicates that many American policymakers believed that the EDC would relieve 
European concerns about reinstating German sovereignty, and that Western Europe merely 
required ‘political unity’ to ‘become a fully capable third power in the international 
system.’398 Therefore, ‘the EDC was a crucial element’ for creating ‘a fully tripolar system.’399 
Once this was achieved, McAllister indicates, one of Eisenhower’s most crucial aims might be 
realized: completely ending the US military presence in Europe.400             
  Pruessen remarks that in the historiography concerning Washington’s EDC involvement, 
scholars initially primarily stressed US fixations on Communist expansionism. Washington 
became determined to increase Western Europe’s ‘“containment” contributions,’ including a 
considerable FRG contribution.401 However, the West had to face two threats 
simultaneously. Therefore, the EDC’s use of German power for confronting the Soviet threat 
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while establishing an official framework for containing Germany, was quite beneficial. 
Accordingly, Pruessen indicates, the argument was that the West, and Washington in 
particular, had two primary motives; ‘EDC was conceived as a tool of “dual containment.”’402    
  However, Pruessen argues this concept ‘should be expanded to “triple containment,”’ 
which includes another significant American motive for supporting the EDC: resolving ‘more 
broadly European problems.’403 According to Washington, Pruessen indicates, European 
allies often conducted ‘problematic’ policies, what Kennan called ‘bad habits’, such as 
extreme nationalism, neutralist inclinations and colonialism.404 A considerable merit, 
Pruessen maintains, was the EDC’s potential capacity to steer many valuable European 
nations in useful directions, particularly toward containing the SU and fixing these structural 
European problems.405  
  Pruessen acknowledges Washington’s crucial Cold War motives for supporting the EDC.406 
Yet, he maintains Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower also considered the 
EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’; a secure way of reintegrating the FRG, and a 
mechanism to contain both the SU and what the Americans regarded as hazardous European 
policies, by promoting European integration. Ultimately, Washington wanted ‘France and 
Germany (…) woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common 
endeavor.’407 Dulles also claimed European defense arrangements required ‘Franco-German 
[military] integration,’ and only the EDC ‘would provide a basis for such cooperation.’408 
                                                          
402 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 130; and Creswell, 
A Question of Balance, 1-4. 
403 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52. 
404 Ibid., 52; The ‘bad habits’ quotation is from George Kennan in FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 620. 
405 Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52. 
406 Ibid., 53. For instance, Pruessen describes the EDC as one element of many 1950s initiatives to reinforce the 
Western Bloc. 
407 Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 67-69; McAllister, No Exit, 242-244; ‘Statement by the Secretary of 
State’, August 31, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 2, 1120-1122; Quotation is from ‘The Secretary of 
State to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer)’, November 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
Volume V, part 1, 854-855. 
408 Quotation is from ‘The Secretary of State to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer)’, 
November 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1, 855. 
67 
 
Pruessen ultimately concludes that a crucial reason for Washington’s strong support for the 
EDC was its potential capability of ‘triple containment.’409 
  Meanwhile, Creswell indicates, West German nationalism was increasing even prior to the 
‘single package’, which seriously worried the CIA, the US High Commission in Germany, and 
US government agencies.410 However, Weisbrode maintains, only few State Department 
officials were concerned about a German military threat, and the majority acknowledged the 
need for rearming Germany.411 Within the influential EUR, Weisbrode indicates, many 
believed American failure ‘to finesse German rearmament’ could have serious repercussions. 
Therefore, some plan like the EDC, or another scheme, was necessary for realizing German 
rearmament. Accordingly, Weisbrode implies, the EUR’s primary intended aim for the EDC 
was delicately achieving German rearmament.412 This position is a clear indication that the 
EUR prioritized German rearmament over the EDC itself, while arguably also indicating that 
the EDC was primarily regarded as a tool for achieving German rearmament.  
  Meanwhile Washington’s role concerning the EDC was, as Weisbrode indicates, convincing 
Paris and Bonn to back the EDC, and lobbying the British for support.413 Once Washington 
realized the EDC-Treaty might never be ratified, Dulles warned on December 14, 1953, that 
without the EDC, Washington would ‘consider an “agonizing reappraisal” of its defense 
commitment to Western Europe.’414 Nevertheless, eventually US diplomacy failed to 
persuade Paris to ratify the EDC-Treaty. Furthermore, Weisbrode argues that Dulles’s 
‘agonizing reappraisal’ speech was more puzzling than helpful, confusing US officials 
whether Dulles was dedicated to the EDC.415  
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  Weisbrode also maintains that the EUR probably could not have performed better with 
promoting the EDC, and that Pierre Mendes-France’s actions of August 1954 implied he 
believed that eventually ‘the German Army’ would be recreated anyway, regardless of EDC-
ratification.416 Furthermore, Weisbrode suggests that possibly the EDC was just not taken 
seriously enough by Washington, because it would conflict with the predominant 
development of Atlanticism.417 However, Weisbrode’s suggestion is incompatible with 
McAllister’s conclusion that ‘the French rejection of the EDC was the most spectacular 
defeat of American foreign policy in the early postwar era.’418 McAllister indicates 
Washington did take the EDC seriously, because in response Dulles ‘lashed out at France’ 
and declared that only if Western European nations would integrate ‘certain functions of 
their government into supranational institutions,’ wars between them could be averted.419     
  Shortly after the French National Assembly had rejected the EDC on August 30, 1954, the 
West arranged an alternative settlement on German rearmament during the London 
Conference and Paris Conference in September-October 1954. These ‘Paris Accords’ allowed 
the FRG a national army, its integration into NATO, and German NATO-membership.420 Bonn 
also renounced producing ‘atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons.’421 The Western 
European Union (WEU), as proposed by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, would exert 
controls on Bonn’s military sovereignty. The WEU, founded by the Brussels Treaty in March 
1948, was a defensive alliance between the Benelux, France and Britain which would 
henceforth also include the FRG and Italy.422         
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Conclusion 
 
  Regarding to what extent the EDC was initiated by the US, Weisbrode is probably correct 
that the EDC should not be characterized ‘as primarily an American initiative,’ because it 
evolved from the French Pleven Plan.423 However, it is also undeniable that the US has been 
closely involved in the EDC’s initiation. Washington pressured France hard in September 
1950 to present a plan enabling German rearmament and, as Beisner indicates, Acheson 
later appealed to Schuman that France would agree with the Spofford Plan.424 Although 
Acheson had to make American concessions, as Gehrz and others imply, the ‘single package’ 
did succeed in initiating a serious process of realizing German rearmament, within a 
European army structure and with French participation.425   
  Acheson also asked Schuman to take charge of realizing a European army, indicating 
Washington’s desire that France would lead this European project enabling German 
rearmament.426 Yet, McAllister indicates, after France’s rejection of the EDC, some lower-
ranking US officials did claim that Washington’s approach concerning the EDC could partly be 
blamed.427 Although Weisbrode argues that the EUR could not have performed better with 
advancing the EDC,428 McAllister refers to PPS official Leon Fuller, who claimed that US policy 
‘had overemphasized the concept of federalism’ and underestimated nationalist opposition 
against the EDC.429 As McAllister concluded, despite a concrete plan for a supranational 
European force was introduced by France, Fuller’s plausible explanation for the EDC’s 
demise was that it became regarded as ‘a US project to force premature federation along 
military lines involving a high risk of German predominance in a European union, and with a 
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too apparent concern for realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed 
forces.’430     
  Regarding the French intended aim with the EDC, Gavin indicated Monnet’s intended aim 
with the Pleven Plan was tackling three interdependent French problems: FRG rearmament, 
keeping Germany restrained and protecting the Schuman Plan.431 Furthermore, Hitchcock is 
arguably correct that the EDC was created from France’s perspective for warding off 
Washington’s plan of the FRG’s ‘national rearmament’, and postponing German 
rearmament.432  
  Eventually Paris did succeed in stalling EDC ratification, and its rejection led to a final 
arrangement on FRG rearmament in 1954 that, as Hitchcock indicated, accomplished 
virtually all of France’s primary foreign policy objectives.433 These were: containing both the 
SU and Germany; not provoking Soviet intervention by prematurely rearming West Germany 
and accordingly deferring German rearmament until NATO had been sufficiently reinforced 
to withstand Soviet aggression; and preventing Germany from obtaining complete 
sovereignty, particularly in military affairs.434 Eventually, Creswell is arguably correct that 
French efforts to postpone and control FRG rearmament implied that disagreements with 
Washington ‘concerned timing and procedure, not ultimate objectives,’ because Paris did 
agree that the FRG should make a military contribution to Atlantic defense.435    
  Regarding the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, McAllister maintains that the 
principal reason for the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration to back the 
EDC was that they believed this framework provided the best durable answer for ‘the 
German problem.’436 NSC-160/1 provides some clarification describing Washington’s three 
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EDC aims: ‘(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision 
of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of 
Germany firmly to Europe and the West.’437 Accordingly, it can be argued that German 
rearmament for countering Soviet expansionism was Washington’s most crucial short-term 
aim, and, contrary to McAllister’s account, the primary reason for both US administrations to 
support the EDC, because of NSC-68’s pressing request for accelerated Western rearmament 
and its strategy of ‘military containment.’438  
  NSC-68 combined with NSC-82, the ‘single package’, NSC-115 and NSC-160/1 clearly prove 
the crucial importance that the US attributed to instigating German rearmament.439 
Furthermore, as Weisbrode indicates, the influential EUR also considered the EDC as 
primarily an instrument for delicately realizing FRG remilitarization.440 European allies also 
believed, as Fuller argued, that Washington primarily regarded the EDC ‘as a device for 
mobilizing German armed forces.’441 Another American aim was that the EDC would serve as 
a tool for FRG’s admittance into NATO.442  
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  Pruessen also provided a plausible account, arguing that Eisenhower and Dulles regarded 
the EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’ for containing Germany, the SU, and 
dangerous European nationalist policies, simultaneously.443 Another important American 
motive, McAllister argued, was that for both US administrations involved, ‘the EDC was an 
essential element in transforming the basic power structure of the international system.’444 
As McAllister indicated, Washington believed the EDC could reassure Western Europe 
concerning the FRG’s sovereignty and rearmament. Therefore, Washington maintained, the 
EDC could advance European integration and enable Western Europe to become ‘a fully 
capable third power in the international system,’ ultimately allowing complete American 
military withdrawal from Europe.445 McAllister maintains this was the primary reason why 
Eisenhower supported the EDC, so arguably this long-term military objective was also an 
intended aim with the EDC from the Eisenhower administration.446 
  Ultimately, it can be concluded that the principal intended American aim for the EDC was 
providing an overarching military structure which would reassure Western European fears of 
a remilitarized Germany and thus enabling European, and particularly French, acceptance of 
rearming the FRG.447 Washington considered this German military contribution to European 
defense a crucial requirement for containing the SU.448 As McAllister argues, one of the 
fundamental reasons for Washington to back the EDC was that influential US officials 
convincingly maintained that the EDC’s supranationalism was the only option to 
accommodate French concerns about FRG rearmament, vetoing the recreation of a German 
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national army, and Bonn’s demand ‘that it would only rearm on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.’449 NATO could not provide the military framework for rearming the FRG, McAllister 
indicates, because the FRG would refuse to concur with discriminatory restrictions within ‘an 
alliance of sovereign states such as NATO.’ 450 McAllister implied the EDC provided a solution 
because it enabled German rearmament without creating a German national army, and 
because Bonn would agree with ‘[nondiscriminatory] restrictions within a European 
institutional framework,’ applicable to every EDC member.451  
 Eventually, both the National Security Council and the State Department had concluded by 
summer 1953 ‘that there is no really good alternative to the EDC.’ The ‘three general types 
of alternatives’ for the EDC that had been rejected, also fundamentally revolved around 
securing Germany’s military potential for Western defense.452 Accordingly, both the Truman 
administration’s and Eisenhower administration’s main reason for supporting the EDC seems 
to have been its potential as an instrumental framework for enabling German rearmament, 
thus providing a German military contribution to Western defense, which was primarily 
motivated by NSC-68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ of the SU.453 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
  Regarding to what extent the EDC was initiated by the US, as Weisbrode indicated, 
characterizing the EDC ‘as primarily an American initiative’ would be inaccurate, because it 
officially evolved from the French Pleven Plan. Nevertheless, particularly regarding initiating 
the EDC Washington played a crucially important role.454 The US had put considerable 
pressure on the French in September 1950, through the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s 
controversial diplomacy to force NATO’s compliance with German rearmament, inducing 
Paris, as several scholars concluded, to present a French plan enabling West German 
rearmament.455 The ‘single package’ proposal and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy were 
unconventional for Washington’s alliance diplomacy. Still, contrary to Gehrz’s account, this 
can be regarded as an exception within ‘Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance 
management,’ since Gaddis does indicate that if Washington considered it imperative, it 
could in rare cases resort to using coercion against Western partners.456   
  It is plausible that the Truman administration did believe that coercive diplomacy to 
enforce German rearmament was necessary during that specific Cold War period. Because of 
the Korean War, increasing Soviet-Western tensions and an eventual Soviet nuclear surprise 
attack by 1954, Washington believed it was necessary to immediately implement the NSC-68 
program and accelerate organizing Western Europe’s defense. Accordingly, it had adopted a 
position in September 1950 that swift German rearmament was of vital importance for 
strengthening Western defense.457 These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency, 
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the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s aggressive diplomacy during September 1950, in order to 
command European compliance with German rearmament. Furthermore, as Gehrz 
indicated, Acheson completely supported the ‘single package’ as a useful strategy to impose 
German rearmament.458     
  One aspect showing Washington’s crucial influence on initiating the EDC was that as part of 
the ‘single package’, Acheson demanded that NATO allies would accept instantly to establish 
a ‘European defense force’, that should incorporate twelve FRG divisions, otherwise Europe 
would not obtain supplementary US aid.459 However, Washington was not the first 
introducing such a concept for rearming Germany, because European allies had already 
unsuccessfully discussed a European army, including FRG divisions, in August 1950.460  
  Although Gehrz argued Acheson could have adopted ‘less coercive tactics,’ Washington did 
accomplish with the ‘single package’ to induce a French proposal enabling German 
rearmament when Paris proposed the Pleven Plan on October 24, 1950.461 Consequently, 
McAllister’s claim that Acheson’s controversial diplomacy to ‘sell’ the ‘single package’ was a 
harmful ‘premature effort’ is unjustified and could instead be better described as a 
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necessary evil from Washington’s perspective, because it eventually generated crucial 
European momentum for tackling the German rearmament problem.462 
  By November 1950, Beisner indicated, Acheson appealed to Schuman that France would 
concur with the Spofford Plan and would take charge of creating a ‘European defense force’, 
showing Washington’s strong involvement in the EDC’s initiation.463 Washington’s role 
would be, as Weisbrode maintained, convincing Paris and Bonn to support the EDC, and 
lobbying the British for support.464 However, a plausible explanation for the EDC’s failure, as 
given by Fuller and acknowledged by McAllister, was that in Europe it eventually became 
regarded as ‘A US project to force premature federation (…) with a too apparent concern for 
realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed forces.’465  
 
  Regarding France’s position on the German problem, a complicating factor was that Paris 
and Washington had several conflicting interests regarding Germany’s reconstruction and 
rearmament during the early Cold War years. Accordingly, Creswell and Trachtenberg’s 
conclusion that essentially ‘Western policy [on Germany] was consensual’ before the 
German rearmament debate from September 1950 onwards, is not plausible.466 Although 
their claim concerning Western consensus on ‘organizing’ western Germany and 
incorporating it into the West, is arguably right,467 Western policy regarding Germany on 
relating fundamental issues was not consensual. As Hitchcock showed, London objected to 
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French initiatives since late 1948 for European integration including Germany,468 and France 
was determined to maintain Allied occupation controls, while the US wanted a strongly 
liberalized occupation regime in Germany.469 For Washington, Hitchcock indicated, French 
obstructionism concerning Germany’s reconstruction, particularly before summer 1948, was 
a crucial issue because it could interfere with the Containment strategy.470 Particularly in the 
long term, it would frustrate Kennan’s Containment strategy’s first stage, restoring the 
international power equilibrium by stimulating self-confidence and economic reconstruction 
in countries ‘threatened by Soviet expansionism,’ such as West Germany.471  
  Finally, as Wall and Hitchcock concluded, France did not have much choice in accepting the 
‘western strategy’, primarily because of its dependence on US aid, its weak international 
position, and because it had no viable alternative.472 Accordingly, Hitchcock concluded, Paris 
ultimately welcomed it, adopting European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, 
reinforce France’s economic reconstruction and increase France’s international power.473 
Like scholars such as Cogan and Hitchcock argued before, it can be concluded that keeping 
Germany subdued, and particularly preventing German military sovereignty,474 remained 
France’s primary objective of its German policy.475 
  Nevertheless, as Creswell maintained, many French policymakers concurred that West 
Germany had to be rearmed for counterbalancing the conventional Soviet military 
superiority.476 Accordingly, Paris did not completely dismiss Washington’s demand of swiftly 
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rearming Germany. France also feared that the US Congress would cut American aid 
otherwise.477 Essentially, the French approach to rearming Germany was that ‘it was really 
only a question of timing,’ starting with increasing NATO’s military power.478 As Creswell and 
Trachtenberg maintained, France’s fundamental position was that only when a Western 
defense organization had been established powerful enough for incorporating FRG troops 
and for coping with the Soviet response, FRG rearmament would be acceptable.479 However, 
Creswell observed, only after Washington had rejected French plans for Atlantic integration 
as a framework for German rearmament,480 did Monnet start considering a European 
army.481  
  Because France was considerably pressured to accept FRG rearmament with the ‘single 
package’, it responded with a constructive alternative: the Pleven Plan.482 Therefore it can 
be concluded, as argued by Creswell and Trachtenberg, Sheetz, and Hitchcock, that Paris was 
instigated by the Truman administration to develop an alternative plan for German 
remilitarization, which intended, however, to prevent an American initiative for direct 
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German rearmament and postpone remilitarization.483 Eventually, it can be argued that 
keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs,484 was the primary reason 
for the French government’s efforts to delay German rearmament, rather than Creswell and 
Trachtenberg’s suggestion that first the West should be ‘strong enough to withstand the 
Soviet reaction,’ which was nevertheless also a crucial factor.485 Ultimately, it can be 
concluded that although the US was not officially responsible for introducing the EDC-
concept to its European allies, Washington did play a crucial role in initiating the EDC by 
demanding European acceptance of FRG rearmament and in steering the solution for this 
problem towards creating a supranational European army.    
 
  Regarding the French intended aim with the EDC, it is important to note that French 
officials seriously worried about the possible negative effect that FRG rearmament could 
have on establishing the ECSC.486 As Hitchcock indicated, Seydoux and Monnet warned in 
September 1950 that German rearmament could lead Adenauer to believe this would 
normalize the FRG’s international and sovereign status, and that Bonn would therefore lose 
its motivation for ECSC participation.487 Meanwhile, Gavin observed, the Quai d’Orsay 
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maintained that the FRG rearmament issue ‘was subordinate to’ the fundamental French 
policy objective that Germany could not regain full sovereignty.488 
  Consequently, Gavin indicated, Monnet’s intended aims with the Pleven Plan were tackling 
the German rearmament problem, keeping Germany subdued and protecting the Schuman 
Plan.489 Furthermore, as Hitchcock maintained, the EDC was created from the French 
government’s perspective for precluding Washington’s plan of the FRG’s ‘national 
rearmament’, and for postponing German rearmament.490 Meanwhile however, the French 
military primarily favored swift German rearmament.491 Eventually, France succeeded in 
stalling EDC ratification, and its rejection resulted in a final arrangement on FRG rearmament 
in 1954 that, as Hitchcock maintained, accomplished France’s primary foreign policy 
objectives.492 Finally, as Creswell concluded, French efforts to delay and control FRG 
rearmament indicated that disagreements with Washington concerned pace and method, 
not fundamental aims, because many French civilian officials did agree that Bonn should 
make a military contribution to Atlantic defense.493    
 
  Concerning the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, it can be concluded that 
Washington actually had multiple aims. NSC-160/1 provides crucial explanation, defining 
three interdependent American aims with the EDC: ‘(1) the securing of a German 
contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival 
of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.’494 
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The first objective was arguably Washington’s most crucial short-term aim, because of NSC-
68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ and its pressing request for an accelerated Western 
rearmament effort.495 Accordingly, it can be argued that this was the fundamental reason for 
the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration to back the EDC, rather than 
McAllister’s claim that both believed this structure provided the best durable answer for ‘the 
German problem.’496 
  As Ruane indicated, as the Soviet threat became more urgent with the Korean War, so did 
NSC-68. Consequently, Washington wanted to swiftly obtain an FRG military contribution, in 
a way that was acceptable for European allies. Accordingly, securing German rearmament 
was the primary incentive for the State Department to develop the EDF concept, which was 
very similar to the European army as part of the EDC.497 Furthermore, considering NSC-68’s 
‘military containment’, it can be argued that ‘securing of a German contribution to European 
defense,’ was first and foremost required for creating the necessary amount of Western 
military strength for containing Soviet expansionism. Arguably only after these security 
conditions had been created, in line with NSC-68, there would be a solid framework that 
could facilitate ‘the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.’498 
  NSC-68 combined with NSC-82, the ‘single package’, NSC-115 and NSC-160/1 clearly prove 
the vital importance that Washington attributed to realizing German rearmament, and also 
provide a clear indication that enabling German rearmament was Washington’s primary 
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intended aim with the EDC.499 Moreover, Weisbrode indicated, within the EUR, responsible 
for promoting the EDC, this concept was predominantly considered as an instrument for 
delicately bringing about FRG rearmament.500 Another indication, McAllister showed, was 
PPS official Fuller’s observation that European allies believed that Washington considered 
the EDC ‘as a device for mobilizing German armed forces.’501 NSC-82 and NSC-115 indicated 
another American aim: the EDC would enable achieving the FRG’s NATO-membership.502  
  Eventually, Pruessen maintained, the EDC’s use of FRG power for confronting the Soviet 
threat while establishing an official structure for containing Germany, resulted in the EDC 
being regarded by Washington ‘as a tool of “dual containment.”’503 Pruessen’s argument 
that Eisenhower regarded the EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’, also containing 
European nationalist policies, was arguably not Washington’s primary intended aim with the 
EDC, because it would still first require FRG rearmament before the EDC could implement 
‘triple containment.’504  
  Another important aim for both US administrations, as McAllister argued, was that the EDC 
would reassure Western Europe regarding the FRG’s sovereignty and rearmament, and 
would advance European integration significantly. Especially from the Eisenhower 
administration’s perspective, McAllister indicated, the EDC could therefore enable Western 
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Europe to eventually become a powerful third international bloc, ultimately making a 
permanent US military presence in Europe superfluous.505 This American aim can arguably 
also be regarded as an effort to restore the international power equilibrium in line with 
Kennan’s first stage of the Containment strategy.506 
  Eventually, it can be concluded that for both US administrations involved the principal 
intended aim for the EDC was implementing a supranational structure capable of reassuring 
Western European fears of a remilitarized FRG and thus enabling European, and particularly 
French, acceptance of FRG rearmament.507 Washington considered a German military 
contribution to European defense a crucial requirement for containing the USSR.508 
Meanwhile, as McAllister argued, influential US officials convincingly maintained that only   
the EDC’s supranationalism could accommodate French concerns about FRG rearmament 
and Bonn’s insistence on rearmament ‘on a nondiscriminatory basis.’509 The FRG refused to 
concur with discriminatory restrictions within ‘an alliance of sovereign states such as 
NATO.’510 Consequently, McAllister indicated, the EDC provided a solution because it 
enabled German rearmament without creating a German national army and without 
complete FRG sovereignty, while establishing ‘[non-discriminatory] restrictions within a 
European institutional framework.’511 
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  Accordingly, Washington’s primary intended aim with the EDC was, as NSC 160/1 stated, 
‘securing of a German contribution to European defense,’512 and its main reason for 
supporting the EDC was probably its potential as an instrumental framework for enabling a 
German military contribution, primarily motivated by NSC-68’s doctrine of ‘military 
containment’ and NSC-68’s urgent request for an accelerated effort to strengthen Western 
defense.513 Eventually, concerning that particular Cold War period between 1950-54, it can 
be argued that Washington’s ambition to transform the FRG, in Creswell’s words, ‘into a 
military and political bulwark against Soviet Communism,’514 was fundamentally 
incompatible with France’s primary objective of its German policy of keeping Germany 
subdued, particularly regarding military affairs,515 and these conflicting interests ultimately 
collided during the EDC affair.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
512 Quotation is from ‘Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the 
Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)’, July 21, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1, 799. 
513 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24-26; 
and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292. See in particular pages 272 and 287-292. 
514 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 33-34. Quotation is from page 33. 
515 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32; See in particular the following scholars that argued that keeping 
Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, remained France’s primary objective of its German 
policy: Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, 8, 12-14; Gerbet, Le Relèvement, 260, 279, Hitchcock, France Restored, 4-5, 
139-141; Cogan, ‘Response to Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’, 31; and Note, September 10, 1950, 
MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 68. 
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